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ABSTRACT
Multiform Segregation in the Context of
the Urban Crises in Las Vegas and
Los Angeles, 1930 – 1980
by
Colin M. FitzGerald
Dr. Todd E. Robinson, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Multiform segregation in the context of the urban crises was a complex sociohistorical phenomenon. The primary focus of this study addresses racial segregation
in at least three basic societal areas: housing, employment, and education. Through
the spatial separation of multiple ethnoracial groups such as African Americans and
Mexican Americans, multiform segregation precipitated the urban crises. In the 50year period this study covers, Las Vegas and Los Angeles sustained a two-tiered class
system according to the prevailing racial attitudes of each city‟s business elite. As a
resort city, Las Vegas could not endure ethnoracial tensions while Los Angeles‟
industrial base provided the city with the socio-political capital necessary to
withstand rioting. Research materials include oral interviews, newspaper articles,
governmental reports, and scholarly manuscripts. The main conclusion of this study
reveals that multiform segregation was a citywide process marked by crises such as
housing shortages, labor disturbances, race riots, and underperforming schools.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of Study
The primary argument being put forth in my thesis centers on multiform
segregation as a distinctly urban process that precipitated crises in housing,
employment, and education. Although the urban crisis stemming from racially
segregated public places, including hotels, parks, buses, and restaurants, was perhaps
the most pervasive in mid-twentieth century American society, I will not consider it
as part of my overall analysis. In effect, it was the close proximity of ethnoracial
groups in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Los Angeles, California, that pushed different
peoples to interact and interrelate. Yet after World War II, whites became
increasingly absent from participating in race relations throughout these cities. That
is, through suburbanization and white flight, Anglo Americans avoided interracial
contact by leaving the city.
With its plethora of casinos and hotels, Las Vegas is the archetypal resort city.
As for Los Angeles, the industrial base that exists around San Pedro and Long Beach
will qualify the city as industrial for the purposes of my thesis. While Los Angeles
could economically and politically endure race riots and labor strikes at times, Las
Vegas could not. Its reliance on tourism meant that ethnoracial disturbances had to
be minimized. The contrast derived from this industrial-resort paradigm holds vast
implications for each city‟s race relations. Since this paradigm coincides with the
urban ethnoracial framework, it serves as an important cross-reference when
analyzing the intricacies of both multiform segregation and the urban crises.
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Urban Ethnoracial Framework
The urban ethnoracial framework is perhaps best understood as a progression
from ghettoization in the early twentieth century to race riots in the mid-twentieth
century. Even though urban ethnoracial history overlaps with the traditional
Montgomery-to-Memphis framework of the Civil Rights Movement, it is consistently
viewed by scholars as a separate entity altogether. The reasoning behind their
distinctive separation ultimately resides in the regional differences that arise
when studying African-American urban history. For example, since this study
investigates two Western cities, references to Martin Luther King, Jr. or Fannie Lou
Hamer or any other Southern civil rights leader will be kept to a minimum. That is,
the Civil Rights Movement was predominantly a Southern phenomenon while urban
ethnoracial history occurred first in Northern cities like Chicago and New York, but
later in Western cities like Las Vegas and Los Angeles.
Although this thesis mostly addresses African Americans and Los Angeles‟
Mexican Americans, there is certainly a need for future research on Asian Americans.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, a concerted effort to deemphasize race in American
society developed. Sociologists such as William Julius Wilson have deemed class
consciousness and social stratification as bigger indicators of economic success than
race. Such socio-economic postulates are becoming increasingly popular in a
political climate that stresses a color blind approach to judicial matters. Yet
recognizing race in American society is essential for preserving the republican values
upon which the United States thrives. It ultimately becomes a viable means for
addressing the various inequities that exist between certain ethnoracial groups.
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Definition of Key Concepts
For the purposes of this thesis, there are several key concepts that merit
clarification. The differences between segregation, desegregation, integration, and
discrimination ought to be clearly defined. These terms are key components of this
thesis‟ main argument, which deems multiform segregation a distinctly urban process
that spurred the urban crises. Multiform segregation consists of a unique combination
of the aforementioned terms; all of which are socio-political processes. While
segregation is the systematic separation of racial groups either by law (de jure) or
custom (de facto), desegregation represents the undoing of the separation that existed
between racial groups. Integration, however, signifies the actual mending of racial
inequities and it necessarily follows desegregation. Evaluating the effectiveness of
integration is difficult, as the process should be about more than just having members
of different races sitting in the same classroom or living in the same neighborhood.
Like integration, discrimination embodies a certain degree of difficulty when
evaluating. It is often considered synonymous with segregation, especially in the
realm of housing. But discrimination is surely distinctive from segregation in the area
of employment. As a socio-political process marked by racial privilege and labor
segmentation, discrimination is perhaps best understood in the context of change over
time. In the reindustrializing period of World War II, blacks and Mexicans
comprised an underprivileged and segmented labor force. They held separate posts in
factories and lived in separate quarters. Ultimately, I believe racial discrimination
changed in the deindustrializing postwar era, as ethnoracial groups like blacks and
Mexicans faced labor exclusion in their ghettos and barrios.
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Reasoning of Timeframe
The years 1930 and 1980 can serve as beginning and end points for this thesis.
Ghettoization for African Americans and barrioization for Mexican Americans
became largely solidified by the 1930s while voluntary desegregation replaced
mandatory busing by the 1980s. After World War I, massive rural-to-urban
migrations occurred among certain racial groups, particularly African Americans.
These migrations mainly altered urban populations in Northern cities like Chicago
and New York, but Las Vegas and Los Angeles also began to receive Southern
blacks. Construction of the Hoover Dam in the 1930s and World War II defense
spending in the 1940s brought great numbers of blacks to the Southwest. The
Bracero Program saw the importation of Mexicans, primarily in California, for
temporary contract labor between the 1940s and the 1960s. This mass influx of racial
minorities into Southwestern cities certainly affected race relations.
Race relations, especially in Los Angeles, were chaotic during the 1940s and
1960s. These two decades are the central focus of Chapter 3, which covers race riots
and the ghetto underclass. Residential segregation and labor segmentation appeared
to be the riots‟ primary precipitants. Yet Los Angeles‟ Zoot Suit Riots in 1943 and
Watts Riots in 1965 contained implications that stretched beyond racial injustice.
They symbolized the failure of municipal governance, especially in the area of public
services. This idea directly incited the push to desegregate many of America‟s urban
public school systems on a mandatory basis. Without integrated schools, children of
segregated backgrounds could never develop the kind of mutual respect for each other
demanded by a democratic society like the United States.
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Comparative Urban History‟s Pitfalls
Comparative urban history is a relatively new field of study. Its origins date
back to the mid-nineteenth century. Charles Dickens‟ 1859 novel A Tale of Two
Cities was probably one of the earliest examples of comparative urban analysis, but
not in a scholarly, albeit academic, manner. The field requires a focused framework
to mold one‟s analysis into a reasonable study. And therein resides the first pitfall.
Urban historians who undertake a comparative approach must be wary in choosing an
analytical framework that relates to the cities being examined and their areas of
interests as scholars. A second pitfall, which is contingent upon the first, involves the
application of one‟s framework to every aspect of each city‟s history. There are,
however, occasional anomalies in a city‟s history that simply will not fit into any
analytical framework.
Fortunately, these pitfalls can be mitigated by relating the local issues of each
city to the larger issues of the nation. This methodology for mitigating comparative
urban pitfalls necessitates a comprehensive overview of the historiographical
materials surrounding a given topic. For example, a sizable historiography exists
concerning school desegregation following the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education
case. Court battles over school desegregation became big areas of ethnoracial
contention in Las Vegas and Los Angeles in 1972 (Kelly case) and 1976 (Crawford
case), respectively. Therefore, I think the extent to which Brown influenced the legal
outcomes of each city‟s court cases constitutes an overarching connection that can
serve as a major point of inter-city analysis while writing a comparative urban
history.
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CHAPTER 2
A PRELUDE TO THE CRISES: HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT
SEGREGATION IN LAS VEGAS AND
LOS ANGELES, 1930 – 1960
Introduction
Investigating housing and employment segregation in Las Vegas and Los
Angeles helps urban historians to identify the primary precipitants of each city‟s race
riots and school desegregation. I tried to structure my thesis like a chronological
crescendo, as it covers increasingly bitter aspects of both cities‟ urban ethnoracial
history until drastic measures occur. And perhaps the biggest indicators of looming
violence are housing and employment segregation. As tangible commodities that
contain what historians John Logan and Harvey Molotch call “use” and “exchange”
values, housing and employment are essential components of a person‟s economic
and social vitality.1 They embody and even determine the nature of class
consciousness among residents in any given community. But when housing and
employment segregation produced heightened levels of racial tension, especially in
the post-World War II era, people began to react forcefully.
Unlike school segregation, housing and employment segregation were deeply
ingrained in American society. The school desegregation debate began in 1850 with
the Roberts v. Boston case while housing desegregation did not start in the courts
until the early twentieth century and finally reached the Supreme Court in 1948 with
Shelley v. Kraemer. Aside from court cases, property rights have an aura of

1

John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987), 1.
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permanence to them. In fact, they are perceived by some Lockean idealists as
indelible rights of Nature. Yet property typically cannot be acquired without labor.
That is, people must work to attain enough capital for the purchasing of property.
Therefore, housing and employment generally go hand-in-hand when considering
their collective societal impact. Although this chapter addresses housing and
employment segregation, there will be a greater emphasis on segregated housing due
to the widespread socio-political implications that it holds for American society as a
whole. The primary problem facing segregated housing and employment, however,
resides in the separate, and thus, unequal systems that developed in urban
environments according to race. In short, just as school desegregation meant forced
busing, housing and employment segregation signified ghettoization for African
Americans and barrioization for Mexican Americans.

People, Property, and Labor
Before investigating the housing and employment segregation in Las Vegas
and Los Angeles, it is important to examine the historiographical implications of
urban and suburban space. In 1947, African-American sociologists Herman H. Long
and Charles S. Johnson published People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in
Housing. This work typified how black ghettos formed in urban environments
through the effective use of housing covenants. For the most part, these covenants
represented a binding legal obligation written into the housing deed that imposed
various stipulations from the seller onto the buyer. Such obligations often contained
elements of racial restriction whereby the seller of a house could not sell it to a buyer
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of color. It was these racial restrictions that entrenched residential segregation into
American society. And it was these racial restrictions that certain African-American
constituencies sought to overturn in 1948 with Shelley v. Kraemer. But little progress
occurred until the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which provided the legislative teeth needed
to minimize legally the effects of race restrictive housing covenants. Yet as Long and
Johnson found, housing covenants spurred the formation of “racial islands” in cities
where black neighborhoods became “ill-kept and unsightly.”2
To explain their findings, Long and Johnson enumerate a variety of
problematic features associated with urban black ghettos. Two of these features,
however, seem to be recurring themes, as they occur “in every major American city.”3
The first involves the idea of black neighborhoods being “located in the oldest part of
the city” while the second entails the notion of blacks as perpetual renters.4 These
ideas date back to the First Great Migration during World War I when African
Americans fled the rural South in favor of the urban North. In general, the areas
where they settled in Northern cities were former neighborhoods of European
immigrants “such as the Little Italys and Little Bohemias.”5 Blacks therefore tended
to occupy the leftover apartments and tenement complexes as the white immigrants
eventually spread to the city‟s outlying areas. Yet this concept of neighborhood
replacement came at a high social cost for African Americans.

2

Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in
Housing (Nashville: Fisk University Press, 1947), 4. This sociological work was particularly
groundbreaking because it represented one of the first studies done by African Americans on racially
restrictive housing covenants. In fact, it reinforced the idea that African Americans disproportionately
experienced the ills of poverty due to limited housing opportunities in urban environments.
3
Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2.
4
Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2-3.
5
Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 2.
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The high social cost facing urban blacks primarily stemmed from the racial
isolation they experienced while sequestered in a ghetto. According to Long and
Johnson, the “social costs of segregation” reside “in the isolation of one part of the
community from another.”6 This idea represented the basic objective of racial
segregation. Isolating ethnoracial groups in urban environments served to maintain a
stratified societal structure where certain peoples are guaranteed privileges at the
expense of others. The ultimate goal, therefore, behind a sociological study such as
Long and Johnson‟s centered on examining the opportunity costs experienced by
everyday African Americans.
Opportunity costs signified the biggest hindrances to racial equality that
African Americans encountered when considering housing segregation. That is,
urban blacks had less economic opportunities than Anglo Americans, and thus, they
had a lower social class standing. The examination of opportunity costs helps urban
historians to uncover the human agency component behind the collective struggle of
inner-city African Americans against residential segregation. In effect, through
various Jim Crow statutes, middle-class whites became juxtaposed on the same socioeconomic scale as upper-class blacks. The differentiation in social class scales
corresponds directly to the notion of “congestion” in black sections of American
cities. While some sociologists viewed residential congestion as a negative symptom
of racial segregation, others saw it as emblematic of communal development. The
latter idea became a fundamental tenet in Earl Lewis‟ 1993 book In Their Own
Interests: Race, Class and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia. Unlike
Long and Johnson, Lewis deemed residential segregation as a vital mechanism for
6

Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 7.
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helping newly immigrated Southern blacks cope with the trials of rural-to-urban
“chain migration.”7
As a complex sociological phenomenon, chain migration involves the
existence of kinship networks among migrating individuals. For example, a migrant
might have both a prearranged place of residence and employment prior to embarking
on his journey. The chain migration that occurred between Northern and Southern
African Americans has probably been over-examined by scholars. But that certainly
does not preclude it as a topic for future research. Although it may have produced
congestion in black areas of American cities like Chicago and New York, rural-tourban chain migration was an instrumental aspect of creating viable AfricanAmerican communities and workforces. In the case of Los Angeles, however, the
rural-to-urban paradigm became reversed as historian Douglas Flamming uncovered
evidence to suggest that many black Angelenos had migrated from Southern cities
like Atlanta, Georgia.8
Aside from Flamming‟s inter-regional study of chain migration in early
twentieth century America, other ghetto synthesis surveys like Gilbert Osofsky‟s
Harlem have examined foreign-based chain migration. In the case of Harlem‟s
African-American population, Osofsky found that discrimination became
institutionalized when southern blacks began to settle the once white neighborhood
after 1900.9 But the migration of Caribbean blacks into what eventually became

7

Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race, Class and Power in Twentieth- Century Norfolk, Virginia
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 31-32.
8
Douglas Flamming, Bound for Freedom: Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005), 40-41.
9
Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto: Negro New York, 1890 – 1930, 2nd Edition (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971), 131.

10

Spanish Harlem during and after World War I further reinforced the Jim Crow
process already underway. The racial infighting that ensued between Harlem‟s
American blacks and Caribbean blacks became emblematic of the larger housing and
employment struggles facing African Americans in cities. Therefore, the American
black ghetto possessed a stratified social structure, which not only confined its
inhabitants to a specified urban area behind invisible walls, but also forced residents
to endure the sometimes harmful effects that chain migration had on housing
segregation.
But the connection between chain migration and housing segregation is not
well-defined in the historiographical scholarship yet. Long and Johnson address the
connection by stating that “new waves of Negro migration to the North and West
have swelled Negro populations in the cities to uncomfortable proportions.”10
Ghettos had become overcrowded and there was a “general housing shortage” among
African Americans in Northern and Western cities.11 Like Gunnar Myrdal, who in
1944 argued that racial segregation contradicted the American Creed, Long and
Johnson further that claim by contending that “the prevalent policy of enforced racial
separation in housing” had become “a disturbing threat and challenge to the
democratic tradition itself.”12 In a 1932 report by the U.S. government‟s Committee
on Negro Housing, Johnson depicted urban black residences as congested,

10

Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 102.
Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 102.
12
Long and Johnson, People vs. Property, 103.
11
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dilapidated, and unsanitary.13 In many American cities, black neighborhoods existed
alongside areas of heavy industry, which negatively affected property values.
Isolated neighborhoods in urban environments with heavy industry are the
prototypical aspects of ethnoracial housing segregation. The images of an AfricanAmerican ghetto or a Mexican-American barrio spring to mind when considering
residential segregation in cities. But the relationship between ghetto formation and
housing segregation has not been analyzed in depth by urban ethnoracial historians.
This relationship ought to merit greater attention in urban ethnoracial historiography
as time progresses. The primary question facing urban ethnoracial historians,
however, involves ghetto types. For example, given its proximity to the
manufacturing processes occurring around San Pedro and Long Beach, black Los
Angeles (Watts) became an industrial ghetto with disputes over labor and housing.
Alternatively, given its dearth of industry, black Las Vegas (Westside) was a
residential ghetto driven by a combination of internal and external forces surrounding
the local casinos and hotels.
Ghetto types are important insofar as they help urban historians to frame the
various complexities inherent in housing segregation. Perhaps the first and most
complete study of the African-American ghetto is Kenneth Clark‟s Dark Ghetto
(1965). As a trained psychologist, Clark considered the ghetto to be an
“institutionalized pathology” that terrorized the psyches of black folk and perpetuated

13

Charles S. Johnson, Negro Housing: Report of the Committee on Negro Housing, eds. John M. Gries
and James Ford (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 26-27. This 1932 report prepared by
Charles S. Johnson for the U.S. government addresses the potential housing crisis facing black
Americans in urban environments.
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vicious cycles of poverty, crime, and suicide.14 Aside from the industrial and
residential ghetto types, Clark provides historians with the pathological ghetto type.
Although all ghettos are urban by definition, their type depends largely on the local
environment. Also, while ascertaining ghetto types, urban ethnoracial historians
should acknowledge the interdisciplinary nature of their scholarly field by
recognizing the socio-economic, psychological, and political elements of it.
Another frequently overlooked aspect of the relationship between housing
segregation and ghetto formation is organized labor. Since people tend to live where
they work, employment and housing become intricately connected. In effect, the role
that trade unions played in determining blue-collar employment opportunities for
urban minorities was significant. Due to a low rate of higher education among urban
minorities, manual labor jobs were their primary means of economic survival.
According to labor historian James Olson, the basic structure of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), which was one of the country‟s earliest and largest labor
federations, “prevented uniform levels of racial justice in unions throughout the
nation.”15 This idea encapsulates the uphill battle facing many ethnic minorities on
the blue-collar employment front. Fortunately for blacks, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) often served as a “viable alternative to [the] industrial
paternalism and union exclusion” of the AFL.16

14

Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 81.
This work is fundamental in the ghetto synthesis debate that occurs in urban ethnoracial history today.
It builds, at least partially, on Clark‟s previous work with prejudice and children at his Harlem Youth
Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU), which was a social activist program designed to create greater
prospects of education and employment for black youths.
15
James S. Olson, “Race, Class, and Progress: Black Leadership and Industrial Unionism, 1936-1945,”
in Black Labor in America, ed. Milton Cantor (Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 153.
16
Olson, “Race, Class, and Progress,” 154.
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Aside from organized labor, the political economy of employment segregation
was an additional factor in precipitating ghetto formation. For the most part, a
political economy consists of a dynamic interplay between governance, production,
consumption, and employment in any given city or state. Outside the AfricanAmerican ghetto, black workers generally represented a colonized labor force that
responded to the whims of “the white working class.”17 Inside the black ghetto,
however, a distinctive political economy developed around the socio-economic values
of communal patronage and self reliance. With respect to the urban labor market, the
differences between the ghetto and the city at large were astounding. Historian Joe
Trotter appropriately captured these differences in Black Milwaukee. His analysis of
“the proletarianization of Milwaukee blacks” demonstrated an adept resourcefulness
among the city‟s African-American workers in an exclusive labor environment.18 As
a process, proletarianization refers to the transition of an individual from employer to
employee, and as such, it is particularly applicable to industrial ghettos like Watts in
Los Angeles. Lastly, even though proletarianization was emblematic of downward
social mobility, Trotter highlights the ability of Milwaukee‟s blacks to embrace their
condition and turn an otherwise negative employment outlook into a positive feature
of ghetto cohesion.

17

William K. Tabb, The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1970), 115.
18
Joe William Trotter, Jr., Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 39. Like Gilbert Osofsky‟s work on ghetto formation in
the 1960s, Trotter‟s book was groundbreaking in the historiography surrounding urban ethnoracial
history. His ghettoization model shifted the emphasis from external forces to internal ones. In other
words, blacks became the central focus instead of laws and whites. He emphasized human agency in
the study of African-American urban history. Prior to Trotter, urban blacks were victims in the large
structural processes created and maintained by suburban whites. In short, Trotter‟s book was the first
to react and upend the ghetto synthesis literature of the 1960s and 1970s.
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Black Las Vegas
Multiform segregation in Las Vegas was an intricate sociological process. It
entailed the systematic separation of racial groups in the areas of education,
employment, and housing so as to create and maintain the privileges of one race over
others. In a way, multiform segregation could only exist in urban environments. The
proximity of varying races to one another precipitated the kind of laws necessary to
subjugate and confine ethnic peoples in urban spaces. Las Vegas serves as an
important case study for examining multiform segregation in the West. It possesses a
segmented labor force with evidence of residential segregation. From education to
employment to housing, racial segregation has existed in America since the first
African-American slaves arrived in 1619. But according to historian C. Vann
Woodward, it was not until the 1890s that segregation became codified in laws when
“the bi-racial partnership of Populism began to dissolve in frustration and
bitterness.”19
In an effort to gain a greater understanding of Las Vegas‟ multiform
segregation, it becomes necessary to investigate the Jim Crow South. This region
produced segregationist laws that were not entirely new. These laws solidified thirty
years of customary segregation based on the racial affinities of Southerners that
existed from the late 1860s to the late 1890s. Jim Crow segregation, on the whole,
constituted a severe impediment to the fluidity of social relations. Blacks and whites
had to follow strict patterns of behavior in both public and private spaces. For
example, “up and down the avenues and byways of Southern life appeared with

19

C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3rd Edition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1974), 80.
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increasing profusion the little signs: „Whites Only‟ or „Colored.‟”20 These signs
made a clear statement that even though the North won the Civil War, the South
prevailed in Reconstruction. While the North attempted to rehabilitate the South in
its secessionist ways, the South infected the North and eventually the West with its
institutionalized racism. And even though Jim Crow was originally a Northern
theatrical concoction, it symbolized a racial mockery that placed whites over blacks.
Racial segregation was a sociological phenomenon that involved all races.
Yet the starkest contrast, and thus, gravest inequities, occurred primarily between
African Americans (blacks) and Anglo Americans (whites) in the United States. Due
to its agrarian society, segregation in the South was a predominantly rural occurrence.
In the North, however, segregation was urban, as its cities contained the largest
population bases of African Americans. Racial tensions occasionally erupted into
violence which caused economic strife and drove many Southerners from their
homes. Blacks and whites alike emigrated from the South to both the Northern and
Western regions of the country. By the 1930s, Southern Nevada was a particularly
favored destination for unemployed Southerners.
The construction of Hoover Dam (originally called Boulder Dam) attracted an
increasing number of black and white Southerners to Clark County, Nevada. These
Southerners brought both their linguistic twang and their racial customs. Due to their
growing presence, Nevada eventually achieved unwarranted notoriety in the media as
“the Mississippi of the West.”21 But this description was largely inaccurate for it
implied that Nevada possessed statewide de jure (legal) segregation. When Jim Crow
20
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did appear in the state, it tended to be highly localized. Even though economic
motives primarily drove African Americans to the West, many emigrated to escape
the institutional racism of the South. Yet according to historian James Hulse,
employment discrimination initially confronted black Las Vegans in 1931, as “the Six
Companies, builders of the Hoover Dam, refused to hire blacks on their construction
crews.”22 Making matters worse for black Nevadans was the fact that Boulder City, a
company town for dam workers, had corporate stipulations that required it to remain
all-white.23
With its single-race demographic, Boulder City appeased Southern white dam
workers and frustrated blacks. In 1932, after a year of discriminatory hiring practices,
the Six Companies employed its first black laborers to work on the dam. But these
African Americans still faced housing discrimination in Boulder City, and thus, they
had to commute from Las Vegas on a daily basis. The combination of employment
and housing discrimination was actually quite foreign to black Nevadans in the Las
Vegas Valley. Yet it was this combination that permitted the feeble barrier between
discrimination and segregation to disintegrate. Customary segregation, therefore,
became contingent upon the precedents set by the types of racial discrimination that
black Las Vegans faced.
Prior to the 1930s, “there was no sign of housing or social segregation in Las
Vegas,” at least on a legal level.24 The city‟s lack of racial discrimination in the
1910s and 1920s resulted from its relatively small population of African Americans.
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Even by 1940, there were only about 200 black residents in Las Vegas.25 Despite
such a seemingly negligible population, many white Las Vegans still pushed to
segregate the city‟s African Americans. Given their small numbers, black Las
Vegans were almost a kind of anomaly. Nevertheless, Las Vegas‟ early black settlers
consistently experienced the evils of racism. Multiform segregation did not become a
sociological aspect of Las Vegas‟ burgeoning urban life until the Great Depression.
But it was ultimately World War II (WWII) that accelerated the processes of
residential and employment segregation in the Las Vegas Valley.
Abraham Mitchell was one of the earliest black settlers in the Las Vegas
Valley. He acquired a sizable plot of land for dryland farming under the 1909
Enlarged Homestead Act.26 This federal law specifically targeted regions of the
country with little rainfall, and thus, it increased the number of acres that a
prospective farmer could potentially own. Mitchell‟s farm mainly produced
vegetables that he sold in town where the Los Angeles and Salt Lake (LA&SL)
Railroad had its Las Vegas station. Other early black Las Vegans, like Joe Lightfoot,
were able to own land and maintain jobs, especially with the railroad.27 But as the
city‟s black population grew, so did the presence of the Klu Klux Klan (KKK). In
1924, the KKK organized a parade down Fremont Street.28 For the most part, this
parade appeared to have a two-fold purpose. First, it demonstrated that white
supremacy was the reactionary populist attitude of white Las Vegans who felt
threatened by blacks in the Downtown area. Second, it signaled civic leaders to
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initiate a process whereby blacks would be systematically separated from whites,
particularly with regard to Downtown businesses.
As economic conditions deteriorated in Las Vegas and across the country
during the 1930s, “white townsmen informally supported efforts to move blacks from
Fremont Street to the old Westside section across the railroad tracks.”29 Historian
Eugene Moehring wrote, “everyone knew that at least for the next two decades, most
commercial and residential development would take place primarily east of the
railroad lines.”30 The city grew toward Hoover Dam, as it represented Las Vegas‟
main source of cheap power and decent jobs. Therefore, black Las Vegans moving to
the Westside (West Las Vegas) faced the prospects of both economic and residential
isolation. As early as 1932, the Westside became known as the “Negro Quarter.”31
This label insinuated that “illegal activities” like bootlegging plagued the area.32
With an ill-reputed image, Westside property values “failed to keep pace with the
citywide appreciation of real estate.”33
Westside land values decreased as the black population increased. This
inverse relationship became especially clear at the onset of World War II. In June
1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which stated “that
there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or
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government because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”34 The primary
reasoning behind Executive Order 8802 was interest convergence whereby the
interests of all Americans, regardless of race, converged over the issue of national
defense. Interest convergence increased efficiency in the defense industry by meeting
labor demands with workers from all ethnic backgrounds. Southern Nevada
experienced a labor boom with the 1937 construction of a processing plant for Basic
Magnesium, Inc., (BMI) in Henderson. Between 1941 and 1943, approximately
4,000 African Americans arrived in Southern Nevada to work either at BMI or in
other WWII-related industries.35 Such a demographic shift resulted in a housing
crisis for the Westside, as its “black population exceeded 3,000, thanks to the
recruitment efforts of Basic Magnesium.”36
Magnesium was one of the magic metals for aircraft production. When
combined with aluminum, it formed a light-weight alloy that was ideal for fuselages
and wings. Gabbs, Nevada, in Northwestern Nye County, contained high-grade
magnesium ore deposits. BMI mined and trucked the magnesium ore down U.S.
Highway 95 into Henderson for processing at its plant. The cheap hydroelectricity of
Hoover Dam served as the main impetus for constructing the BMI plant in
Henderson. After processing, BMI shipped the magnesium to aerospace firms like
Northrop and Hughes Aircraft in Southern California. The intricacies of magnesium
mining and processing brought around 13,000 jobs to Henderson, which was to
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overtake Las Vegas as the largest city in Clark County.37 Yet black workers at the
Henderson plant faced residential segregation. BMI built only about 300 residences
for African-American employees at Carver Park, which was east of Boulder Highway
and separate from the white residences.38 To casual observers, it seemed as though
these African Americans had become passive victims in an active process of
corporate segregation.
But blacks in Carver Park and West Las Vegas did not necessarily perceive
themselves as victims. One such resident of the Westside was Lubertha Johnson.
She arrived in the Las Vegas Valley with her family in 1943 during the labor boom
occasioned by Basic Magnesium.39 As a result of employment discrimination,
Johnson held a variety of jobs. She first worked as a social worker in Carver Park,
named for George Washington Carver, a peanut scientist at the Tuskegee Institute in
Alabama. Her work led her to conclude that “most of the black migrants who came
seeking jobs in the metal industries were originally from two Southern states,
Arkansas and Louisiana.”40 For Johnson, this conclusion helped to explain the
employment discrimination facing most blacks in Henderson.41 In addition, Carver
Park‟s housing segregation only exacerbated the fact that “blacks were usually given
less desirable dirty jobs” at BMI.42
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Johnson‟s story epitomized the plight of other black Las Vegans living in the
Westside. She became a staunch advocate of African-American civil rights, as her
40-year membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) indicated.43 Johnson felt that with enough hard work and
determination, every discriminatory obstacle could be overcome. Yet by the 1950s,
the Westside still lacked adequate housing and municipal services such as water and
sewer facilities. In response, she joined “the Human Rights Commission of the City
of Las Vegas” to address the housing crisis in the Westside.44 Johnson believed that
part of the problem for black Las Vegans resided in the difficulty of securing
mortgages.45 Las Vegas‟ banks were hesitant to lend money to African Americans,
which primarily stemmed from the vestiges of New Deal practices like redlining. In
this regard, Las Vegas was similar to other American cities.
Another Westside resident who endured the effects of customary segregation
was Sarah Ann Knight. Her family came to Las Vegas in 1942, after her father
obtained employment in Henderson. She stated that there was “no housing over on
the Westside” and that people had to either live in tents or “sleep in the streets.”46
Knight‟s family was fortunate enough to live in “little shacks,” but they had to walk
“as much as five blocks to haul water.”47 Automobile traffic in the Westside was
sparse, as there were no paved streets. Like Johnson, Knight also recalled how
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difficult it was for black Las Vegans to obtain bank loans.48 As a result, many
Westside blacks simply built their own homes out of any sturdy materials that they
could find. The ad hoc manner in which the Westside‟s homes and streets developed
contributed greatly to its reputation as a slum. But the fact that the Westside
contained only African Americans made it a ghetto.
By the early 1950s, multiform segregation in the Westside was firmly in
place. After working as a dealer in the segregated Cotton Club, Knight fled Las
Vegas in favor of Hawthorne. She mistakenly believed that racial segregation was
not as prevalent in Nevada‟s rural communities.49 Although Knight and her husband
built a respectable restaurant and casino business that catered primarily to black
laborers at the Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), they consistently faced bomb
threats from their white neighbors.50 In 1957, Knight decided to move back to Las
Vegas only to discover that the city was more segregated than before she left. At that
time, it became eminently clear to many Westside blacks that Las Vegas was
approaching a breaking point with respect to race relations. Given that public
accommodations on the Strip were still off limits to African Americans meant it was
time for blacks to take action.51
As members of the NAACP, Johnson and Knight sought to end segregation in
education, employment, and housing. The NAACP first organized a local chapter in
Las Vegas in October 1918.52 Under the guidance of Leland Hawkins in the 1930s, it
investigated the discriminatory hiring practices of the Six Companies on the Hoover
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Dam project.53 In the 1940s and 1950s, the Las Vegas NAACP maintained its
primary focus on ending employment segregation. Without jobs, black Las Vegans
were unable to acquire adequate capital for fighting segregation in education and
housing. Consequently, Johnson‟s NAACP efforts mainly concerned the segregated
elementary schools in the Westside, while Knight‟s involvement mostly related to
black voter registration.54 In short, it was the varying interests of the Las Vegas
NAACP‟s members which ultimately pushed the organization to attack all forms of
segregation by the 1960s.
The president of the Las Vegas NAACP in 1960 was Dr. James McMillan.
Originally from Mississippi, he came to Las Vegas in the mid-1950s after being
discharged from serving as a dentist in the U.S. Army.55 Along with Dr. Charles
West, a medical doctor, McMillan was one of the only African-American
professionals in the city. He opened a dental practice on West Bonanza Road and
bought a house on Wyatt Avenue.56 Both of these locations were inside the
boundaries of the Westside, which included A Street on the East, Bonanza Road on
the South, Highland Avenue (now Martin Luther King Boulevard) on the West, and
Lake Mead Boulevard on the North. The traditional boundaries of the Westside
ghetto have expanded since the 1950s, but the core streets remain. Unfortunately for
53
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McMillan, his dental practice on the corner of Bonanza and H Street saw no business
during its first month of operation.57 In order to attract more black business, he
stayed open later, increased his involvement in the Las Vegas NAACP, and helped
start the city‟s first African-American newspaper.58
Modeled after the Chicago Defender, the newspaper began operation in 1957.
McMillan and West provided the initial funding; they were among the few black Las
Vegans with enough economic resources to initiate and oversee such a task.59
Originally called The Missile, the newspaper‟s name changed to The Voice in 1963
when West acquired full financial control.60 The primary purpose of The Voice was
to bring positive news on a weekly basis to Las Vegas‟ black community.61 It
instructed African Americans living in the Westside to pool their money together in a
collective effort to fight multiform segregation throughout the city.62 Since McMillan
first published the newspaper out of the local NAACP office, he used it to transmit
updates on the desegregation battle. This communication method helped instill a
sense of immediacy in black Las Vegans, particularly with regard to civil rights
issues.
In February 1960, McMillan received instructions from the national NAACP
office to organize against all forms of segregation in the region.63 As a result, he
wrote a letter to Mayor Oran Gragson in March 1960, which threatened a black
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boycott of public accommodations on the Strip.64 The boycott would also be
accompanied by a civil rights march on Las Vegas Boulevard (The Strip).65
According to McMillan, his letter would not have received the amount of attention
that it did if it was not for Hank Greenspun.66 As editor and publisher of the Las
Vegas Sun, Greenspun ran a story on McMillan‟s letter. It garnered an immediate
response from Mayor Gragson who called a special meeting with McMillan and many
of the city‟s business leaders. Yet the mayor “abruptly canceled the meeting
(scheduled for March 23) after some political and business leaders expressed fears
that it could become a fertile ground for hot-headed agitators.”67
After the meeting‟s cancellation, the potential for a civil rights demonstration
appeared high. But “word came on March 26 that the city would order the integration
of all public places within municipal borders and the Strip would voluntarily follow
suit.”68 McMillan did not have to act on his threats of a black boycott and march. As
a resort city that relied heavily on tourism for revenue, Las Vegas simply could not
afford to handle race-based disturbances. Tourists would have refused to visit a city
mired in a civil rights war. Although McMillan enjoyed the initial fruits of his civil
rights victory, he began to question whether an integrated Las Vegas actually
benefited the black community.69 From an economic viewpoint, McMillan believed
that integration only helped white businesses flourish and black businesses suffer.70
This mentality was similar to Malcolm X‟s rejection of civil rights, as he felt that civil
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rights ultimately helped whites sustain their power structure. Prior to integration,
black Las Vegans had a distinctive place to call their own. As an insulated
neighborhood, the Westside represented a unique cultural milieu for the
underprivileged. But that was precisely what black Las Vegans had to relinquish in
the name of equality. In short, the drive for racial equality in black Las Vegas did not
end in March 1960, as problems ranging from welfare rights to segregated schools
continued to plague Westside residents.

Multiethnic Los Angeles
Unlike Las Vegas, Los Angeles‟ multiform segregation involved multiple
ethnoracial groups. Due to the wide array of ethnoracial groups living in Southern
California in the 1930s and 1940s, Los Angeles‟ multiform segregation was also
multiethnic. In effect, African Americans were not the only racial group affected by
the city‟s multiform segregation, as Mexican Americans encountered it as well.
Isolated pockets of residential and employment segregation existed in the traditional
black and Mexican neighborhoods of South Central and East Los Angeles,
respectively. For the most part, I believe there are two schools of thought regarding
Los Angeles‟ multiethnic segregation. Either segregation was a systemic by-product
of the city‟s expansive growth during the early twentieth century or it was a necessary
evil in an attempt to control that growth. Perhaps Los Angeles‟ annexation efforts did
the most to further these two schools of thought.
In the 1910s and 1920s, Los Angeles embarked on a major annexation process
to consolidate what were mainly unincorporated communities in its vicinity. While
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Las Vegas failed to annex the lands south of Sahara Avenue, by the 1930s, Los
Angeles had grown to around 450 square miles due to annexation. On the whole,
annexation growth was coercive since it typically stemmed from a survival-of-thefittest mentality relating to municipal services. In Los Angeles, the primary
precipitant behind its annexation growth was the completion of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct in 1913. The unincorporated communities of the San Fernando Valley
needed access to water, and thus, their options were either to incorporate and levy
taxes to purchase water from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP) or join the city of Los Angeles as an annexed community. A 1915 voter
referendum by San Fernando Valley residents permitted Los Angeles to annex over
150 square miles of land for the purpose of gaining access to municipal water
services. With the city acquiring large tracts of land through annexation, the drive to
claim urban space among various ethnoracial groups became heightened.
The drive to claim Los Angeles‟ urban ethnoracial space occurred at an
increased pace after each World War. Domestic chain migration from the East
brought scores of African Americans westward. Whether their motives comprised
finding work, securing housing, or escaping Jim Crow, black Angelenos increased
from about 15,000 in 1920 to about 40,000 in 1930.71 Although this exponential
increase of Los Angeles‟ black population continued at a similar rate in the 1950s and
1960s, the circumstances were different. Urban spaces had largely been claimed, but
there is always a hint of temporality behind spatial relations, especially when
considering ethnoracial groups. Watts, for example, was once a working-class white
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neighborhood driven by employment surrounding the railroad industry. African
Americans, in fact, did not become the racial majority there until after World War II.
The earliest socio-historical studies to treat Watts and South Central Los
Angeles as a black ghetto did not emerge until the 1970s. These early studies tended
to highlight the external forces such as Jim Crow laws acting on urban blacks. In
“The City of Black Angels,” historian Lawrence De Graaf claimed the study of black
urban populations in the American West has been largely ignored because Western
blacks constituted “only 2.2 percent of the nation‟s Negro population” by 1940.72
However, the census had long recognized Los Angeles “as one of only two
substantial Negro centers in the West.”73 The two main questions De Graaf attempted
to answer were: when did the city‟s black community form a ghetto and why did it
develop in the way it did.74 To construct plausible solutions to the aforementioned
questions, De Graaf drew an important distinction for the word “ghetto.” In general,
a ghetto is either “an area which houses people concerned with the perpetuation of a
peculiar (and different) culture” or “a slum neighborhood characterized by poverty
and physical and social deterioration.”75 Unlike most ethnoracial historians at the
time, De Graaf embraced the former definition, which deemed Los Angeles‟ black
ghetto a positive force for culture creation.
By 1930, a black ghetto had emerged along Central Avenue (See Map II in
Appendix). It predominantly consisted of “single-family dwelling units,” which led
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many onlookers “to conclude that the city had no extensive Negro slum.”76 But Los
Angeles‟ rapid development in the early twentieth century had eclipsed black
frustrations. Construction of railway lines and suburban expansion took priority over
the social deterioration and racial confinement of particular ethnoracial groups. Still,
there was an overwhelming sense of cultural cohesion in the residential settlement
patterns of black Angelenos. Insofar as the ghetto formation process required racial
unity, the city‟s African-American population centralized in a manner that brought
members of the same race together.77
Similar to African-American ghetto formation, the development of Los
Angeles‟ Mexican barrio contained elements of both racial confinement and cultural
cohesion. Neighborhood replacement affected the barrio, as Mexican Americans
settled “along the Los Angeles River” east of Downtown in an unincorporated area
“amid old housing tracts belonging to European ethnics of an earlier generation.”78
Yet unlike the black ghetto, the Mexican barrio faced a linguistic barrier. For
Mexican Americans, the Spanish language was undoubtedly a source of pride in the
barrio, as it signified a form of covert resistance to the de facto English standards
outside the barrio. Aside from linguistic discrimination, which limited housing and
employment opportunities for Mexican Americans at times, the Eastside barrio was a
place of architectural discrimination as well. For instance, features commonly
associated with classical Spanish architecture, such as red-tile roofing and stucco,
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became adopted by white Angelenos to fashion their single-family homes in a manner
that romanticized Los Angeles‟ Spanish (not Mexican) heritage.
The techniques of adopting and romanticizing Spanish architecture among
white Angelenos were emblematic of a larger socio-political process. According to
architectural historian Dana Cuff, that socio-political process was “slum clearance.”79
In effect, slum clearance permitted city officials to diminish the prevalence of Los
Angeles‟ Mexican past by gentrifying neighborhoods. To gentrify a neighborhood
means to increase property values through building reconstruction and renovation.
On the surface, gentrification may seem like a beneficent process, as it seeks to
eradicate poverty by engendering wealth on a communal level. But the unintended
consequences of gentrification often entail the removal of underclass ethnoracial
groups in favor of wealthier residents. In short, “slum clearance” was merely the
term used to describe urban renewal prior to the advent of the term “gentrification” in
the mid-1960s.
Perhaps the most complex example of slum clearance in Los Angeles
occurred at Chavez Ravine. Although not necessarily part of the Eastside barrio, the
Chavez Ravine neighborhood largely contained Mexican Americans in public
housing tenements. But in the early 1950s, Mayor Norris Poulson “was willing to do
virtually anything” to attract the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles.80 Poulson
claimed that he was working on behalf of a “legion of backers” who wanted another
professional sports team in addition to the Los Angeles Rams.81 Yet according to
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Cuff, there was a severe backlash against public housing in the city at the time.82 And
since Chavez Ravine was one of Los Angeles‟ public housing epicenters, Poulson
believed that it was a prime real estate opportunity for developers like Fritz Burns to
build a new stadium.83 Burns and Poulson became close allies as “eminent domain
proceedings” eventually evicted Mexican Angelenos from their tenements.84
Ultimately, it was ironic for public housing opponents to argue that Chavez Ravine
tenements represented “creeping socialism” while using eminent domain to acquire
public land.85
Public housing tracts like Chavez Ravine became increasingly prevalent after
Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949. Even though the National Housing Act of
1934 had already established basic home loan provisions through the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and the Home Owners‟ Loan Corporation (HOLC), the new
law authorized large-scale federal funding for the creation of public housing
complexes in municipalities. The 1949 law also guaranteed public funds to
encourage both slum clearance and community redevelopment. In the case of Chavez
Ravine, therefore, an incentive existed for Mayor Poulson to declare the
neighborhood a slum. Local urban renewal efforts had effectively become
incentivized by the federal government. It was now in Los Angeles‟ best interest to
access federal funds for community reinvestment projects like the construction of a
professional sports stadium. For the Mexican Americans living in Chavez Ravine,
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who suffered from the unintended consequences of the 1949 Housing Act, they
mostly relocated within the built environment of the Eastside barrio.
But the Mexican-American residents of Chavez Ravine did not succumb to
governmental coercion without a legal battle. One of the primary arguments made on
their behalf was that Los Angeles‟ Housing Authority had no right to deed nearly 200
acres of public land to the city (and eventually to the Dodgers) because that land had
been sold to the housing authority by the federal government “for public use only.”86
This argument, however, encountered resistance in the California Supreme Court, as
it offered a “unanimous decision” affirming “the constitutionality of the city‟s
deeding of the acreage.”87 In fact, as early as 1953, the city had the option to
purchase those 200 acres of Chavez Ravine (public) land from the federal government
for about $1 million.88 This option ultimately stemmed from a compromise worked
out by Mayor Poulson between the federal and city governments, “which ended the
public housing program in Los Angeles.”89 Nevertheless, it was clear that Chavez
Ravine faced the prospects of Anglicization, as its Mexican heritage appeared
increasingly whitewashed.
Since the city‟s original public housing plans for approximately 3400 “lowrent dwelling units” in Chavez Ravine became nullified in the courts, the
neighborhood‟s Mexican American residents had to relocate.90 Their initial
migratory impulses led them to the Eastside barrio. This intra-urban migration across
the concrete-lined Los Angeles River was symbolic for the city‟s race relations.
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Although the river was a marvel of physical engineering, it also signified a socially
constructed racial barrier between Anglos and Mexicans.91 Historian William
Deverell writes:
A concrete river used to be a beautiful thing, a place where exuberant
Angelenos would be able to stroll placidly amidst the visionary city that they
had created, the city of the future, the city that had beautified itself by
perfecting Nature. But concrete rivers are not beautiful today. The enduring
irony of the Los Angeles River is that those exuberant future-obsessed Anglos
do not inhabit the river‟s spaces. It is the immigrant and homeless, mostly
Latino, people living in a depressing deindustrialized corridor who drink the
water, swim and wash in it, and even farm its banks and belly.92
This remark aptly encompasses the sharp divide between the appearance and reality
surrounding the river‟s man-altered existence. White Angelenos viewed the river as a
symbol of progress to protect their high-value real estate from devastating floods
while Mexican Angelenos saw it as a kind of invisible wall to solidify racial lines and
section off their inferior property (urban spaces) along the Eastside.
With an increasing influx of Mexican Americans into the Eastside barrio
during the 1950s and 1960s, some Latino families began to push further eastward in
the hope of securing suburban property. Just as black Las Vegans lived in the
Westside ghetto and then expanded out to Carver Park in Henderson, Mexican
Angelenos spread outward beyond the Eastside barrio to create their version of the
American Dream in Los Angeles‟ eastern suburbs. For historian Greg Hise, the
socio-economic and political process of suburbanization, especially in Los Angeles, is
synonymous with urbanization.93 He states:
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In the past decades, critics and urban theorists who examine contemporary
spatial patterns have begun staking the contours of a postmodern urbanism,
presenting evidence that urban regions, such as the five-county Los Angeles
conurbation, represent a new kind of city, a landscape with indeterminate
coordinates, loosely anchored by speculative office parks, big-box retail, and
gated residential enclaves.94
This statement is akin to Lewis Mumford‟s “megalopolis” in which distinct
metropolitan areas like Las Vegas and Los Angeles are linked by either
transportation, industrial, or sociological means. And given the cross-cultural contact
that exists between the two cities, Las Vegas has become the easternmost suburb of
Los Angeles. Yet one of the primary sociological questions remains, where do black
and Mexican Americans fit into the megalopolis that is Los Vegas?
One area where Mexican Americans began to claim en masse was La Puente,
California. Sociologist Gilda Ochoa conducted a case study of the MexicanAmerican community in this Los Angeles suburb which examined the influence of
immigration on the local culture. For the most part, she argues that the 1940s and
1950s Bracero Program, which brought thousands of Mexican immigrants to work
initially in Los Angeles‟ wartime industries and eventually on the area‟s various
farmlands, “created a social and economic hierarchy within the Mexican-origin
community.”95 This socio-economic hierarchy extended into Mexican-American
suburbs like La Puente, as a barrio developed under circumstances similar to Los
Angeles‟ Eastside barrio. In referring to the 1950s, La Puente resident Leticia
Mendoza recalls:
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We had a barrio, and it was from Central up to Valley Boulevard. We were
not allowed to buy a home outside of Central. We were all segregated. We all
lived in this barrio, and we all knew each other. The area isn‟t that big. Where
the library is now, that was our school, called Central School.96
The existence of La Puente‟s barrio, which was emblematic of housing segregation,
reinforced the idea of a suburb as replicating elements of the core city around which it
grew. Barrios and ghettos, therefore, often became common features of ethnoracial
suburbs where the majority race was not white.
Aside from La Puente‟s barrio (and its housing segregation), another common
feature of an ethnoracial suburb was school segregation. The primary goal behind
segregated schooling in La Puente involved Americanization programs for the
Mexican community.97 These curricular programs emphasized learning the English
language and American culture while classes in civics and California history
attempted to instill in the minds of young Mexican students a respect for American
forms of government and authority.98 District Superintendent D. P. Lucas remembers
the objectives of the barrio‟s Central Avenue School as follows:
Mexican tots who were among the first pupils at Central have carried to their
homes the type of instruction that is imparted in the school. These boys and
girls, some of them, have grown to manhood and womanhood and have been
able to create an entirely different attitude toward the institutions of the state
than their parents hitherto had experienced.99
In effect, Mexican-American (suburban) school segregation differed from the black
experience, especially since the language barrier provided school officials with a
definitive aim when developing Americanization programs. But the black suburban

96

Ochoa, Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community, 50.
Ochoa, Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community, 52.
98
Ochoa, Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community, 52.
99
Ochoa, Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community, 52.
97

36

experience in Los Angeles occurred closer to the ghetto in South Central. And in
many ways, it did not occur at all.
Aside from a few upper-class black families who made their way to Pasadena,
California, prior to World War II, many African Americans remained confined in Los
Angeles.100 Essentially, Los Angeles‟ black suburbanization was a socio-economic
process defined by “spillover ring developments” that stemmed from “increased
housing demand.”101 Suburban cities like Inglewood and Compton began to receive
an influx of black Angelenos from the Watts ghetto in the 1960s.102 Yet cities such as
South Gate and Lynwood, which have nearly identical proximities to Watts as
Inglewood and Compton, were largely successful in preventing African Americans
from spilling over into their neighborhoods. In short, racially restrictive housing
covenants, and later, homeowners‟ associations (HOAs), were two of the biggest
factors in determining the direction and scale of suburbanization for black Angelenos.
As evidenced by the limited nature of Los Angeles‟ black suburbanization in
the 1950s, general African-American mobility within the city‟s limits was also at risk.
Even though a few black families began to settle in the San Fernando Valley districts
of Pacoima and Van Nuys, they faced “a pattern of housing segregation” similar to
that found in the South Central ghetto.103 Nestled between Pacoima and Van Nuys
was the district of Panorama City. Originally developed as a planned community by
Fritz Burns and Kaiser Community Homes (KCH) in the 1940s, Panorama City did
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not permit the settlement of non-white ethnoracial groups. But the largest pocket of
African-American housing segregation existed “in an area of Pacoima bounded
generally by the Southern Pacific track, Foothill [Boulevard], Sun Valley, and the
boundary of the city of San Fernando.”104 This area of Pacoima was ultimately an
example of both functional and racial segregation, as the Southern Pacific rail line
functionally separated residential and industrial processes while Foothill Boulevard
and other “artificial” boundaries racially separated Pacoima‟s residents.
By the 1960s, housing for African Americans in Pacoima and South Central
(Watts) was becoming a crisis. Los Angeles‟ black population faced a housing
shortage, as families often endured congestion and overcrowding in homes that had
been previously abandoned by whites.105 It was clear that access to adequate housing
offered “the key to the goals [that black Angelenos] strive toward – equal
opportunity, equal participation, [and] assimilation into the community as a
whole.”106 In effect, adequate housing gave black Angelenos a sense of place that
grounded them in the everyday life of the city. Yet for the most part, Los Angeles‟
municipal government did little to address the housing needs of its black residents.
The federal government eventually intervened in 1968 with plans for “a 220-unit”
housing project in Pacoima.107 Although it partially placated the housing shortage,
the Pacoima project arrived three years after Watts‟ segregation-induced violence.
Black Los Angeles in the 1960s, therefore, underwent a transformation that started
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with housing and employment segregation and ended with an urban crisis marked by
race riots and police brutality.

Conclusion
Overall, housing and employment segregation were deeply entrenched
features of American society in the mid-twentieth century. They consisted of
physically and socially separating urban and suburban spaces according to the
dictates of race. There was an inherent fear among property owners that racially
integrated neighborhoods resulted in depressed home values. This fear resounded
widely throughout the school desegregation debates of the 1960s and 1970s, but it
originated in the post-World War II period of cookie-cutter-style suburbanization.
For example, suburban tract housing, such as the development of Levittown, New
York, between 1947 and 1951, was an exclusive process open only to white families.
The racial exclusivity of suburbanization, however, was an outgrowth of the racial
fears that existed in the city. In short, racial divisions, especially in urban and
suburban housing, pushed many American cities to the brink of violence.
Although employment segregation was not given the same attention as
housing segregation in this chapter, it will resurface when discussing the relationship
between social class and race riots in the next chapter. The primary reason housing
segregation often overshadows employment segregation when discussing these topics
concurrently is that many urban ethnoracial groups tend to work where they live, as
they do not possess the means to move when employment becomes scarce.
Sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton recognize the heightened
importance of residential (housing) segregation when compared to urban employment
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conditions. They assert that residential segregation deprives certain ethnoracial
groups, especially African Americans, of socio-economic opportunities and privileges
otherwise enjoyed by whites.108 This assertion speaks to the general lack of options
facing residentially segregated ethnoracial groups. Yet ultimately, through urban
historical studies of these ethnoracial groups and their struggles with racial
segregation, people will conclude that “the United States cannot be called a race-blind
society.”109
As for the urban societies of Las Vegas and Los Angeles, housing and
employment segregation were particularly prevalent aspects. They contributed to an
increasing degree of social isolation among certain ethnoracial groups. Black Las
Vegans, for instance, endured systematic separation from the city‟s white community,
which often stemmed from either coercive laws rooted in an institutionalized racism
or customary practices centered on a vibrant communal patronage in the Westside
ghetto. In multiethnic Los Angeles, however, both black and Mexican residents
experienced the effects of racial isolation. The idiosyncratic differences that
developed between the South Central (Watts) ghetto and the Eastside barrio, such as
the language barrier, only enhanced the degree of Los Angeles‟ ethnoracial diversity.
And this diversity even extended into the city‟s suburbs, which was a notably absent
feature of the Las Vegas‟ suburbanization (aside from Henderson‟s Carver Park).
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CHAPTER 3
THE URBAN CRISES ERUPT: RACE RIOTS AND THE
GHETTO UNDERCLASS IN LAS VEGAS AND
LOS ANGELES, 1940 – 1970
Introduction
Race riots and the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas and Los Angeles were the
result of years of substandard housing, schooling, and employment for both African
and Mexican Americans. This chapter will primarily address the racial violence in
Los Angeles, the Zoot Suit Riots (in the 1940s) and the Watts Riots (in the 1960s). It
will also consider the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas, which exists below the working
poor. As part of the American lower class, I think the ghetto underclass is often
associated with the typical elements that define racial segregation such as public
housing, underachieving schools, and labor segmentation. And despite their
reluctance to use a term like „undeserving poor‟ when referring to the ghetto
underclass, sociologists like William Julius Wilson argue that “a culture of poverty
and a culture of welfare” have developed around this largely ethnoracial social class.1
Conceivably, the most insightful way to view the ghetto underclass and its
role in race riots is through the analytic frame of economic restructuring. In the postWorld War II era, the shift in a city‟s economy from manufacturing to service defines
economic restructuring. Otherwise referred to as deindustrialization, this socioeconomic process pulled capital and jobs away from the inner city, which
consequently brought about depressed circumstances for the ethnoracial groups living
1
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there. But the ghetto underclass cannot be understood merely as a product of postwar
deindustrialization. Even though the post-World War II era saw a net decrease in
industrial output, which exacerbated working conditions in the urban core, the ghetto
underclass existed well before this time period. For the purposes of this chapter,
postwar deindustrialization and the ghetto underclass will be juxtaposed in relation to
the race riots in Las Vegas and Los Angeles.

Mob Mentalities and Class Consciousness
Prior to examining race riots and the ghetto underclass in Las Vegas and Los
Angeles, it becomes necessary to investigate the larger historical environment
surrounding them. In 1968, the United States government published the Kerner
Commission‟s report concerning the race riots that erupted throughout the country the
previous year. This report was a product of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) and it became a bestseller after more than two
million Americans purchased copies. But apart from investigating “24 disorders in
23 cities,” the Kerner Commission also produced a detailed sociological sketch of
how America had become so racially polarized.2 Chapter 2 of the report in particular
examined both “the kinds of communities” in which race riots occurred and “certain
popular conceptions about riots.”3
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Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Chapter 2 in the Kerner Commission‟s
report was the description it attributed to “the typical rioter.”4 It states:
The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was a Negro, un-married male
between the ages of 15 and 24 in many ways very different from the
stereotypes. He was not a migrant. He was born in the state and was a lifelong resident of the city in which the riot took place. Economically his
position was about the same as his Negro neighbors who did not actively
participate in the riot. Although he had not, usually graduated from high
school, he was somewhat better educated than the average inner-city Negro,
having at least attended high school for a time.5
Notwithstanding its sweeping generalizations, this statement helps urban ethnoracial
historians to capture, at least partially, the racial profile assigned to rioters. It also
provides insight into the potential reasons why a person would engage in such largescale communal violence. Even though the Kerner Commission‟s report does not
specifically address the riots in Las Vegas or Los Angeles, it still aids the sociohistorical framing of those events in the context of the ghetto underclass. As a result,
either disrupting the status quo of racial inferiority or rejecting civil rights as a white
man‟s concoction seemed to be two of the primary motives for why AfricanAmerican men rioted. So, was racial segregation in urban environments the root
cause of the 1967 riots? Urban ethnoracial historians now possessed a basic postulate
from which they could research, discuss, and debate.
Aside from depicting typical rioters and offering reasons why race riots
occurred, the Kerner Commission‟s report outlined a variety of choices facing
Americans for the future course of race relations. In effect, the two most viable
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options included “the Enrichment Choice” and “the Integration Choice.”6 For the
Enrichment Choice, “the nation would seek to offset” racial segregation in inner-city
black ghettos by “creating dramatic improvements” through increased federal
spending for these “disadvantaged” neighborhoods.7 Under the Integration Choice,
American society would be drastically remade to reflect the kind of distributive
justice necessary for preserving a democratic republic. That is, the federal
government would make a concerted effort not only to improve the infrastructure of
the inner-city ghetto, but also to help members of the ghetto underclass move into
“largely white residential areas.”8 Despite its interest in facilitating AfricanAmerican social mobility, the federal government had clearly placed the burden of
integration on the ghetto underclass.
The burden of integration on the ghetto underclass, however, existed well
before the Kerner Commission‟s recommendations. In fact, three years prior to the
publication of the Kerner Commission‟s report, President Lyndon Johnson signed a
law to create the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). As part of
Johnson‟s Great Society initiatives, this new agency sought to oversee an increased
governmental role in urban housing. In doing so, it built upon many of the ideas and
policies found in the 1949 Housing Act. That is, local urban renewal efforts ought to
be prioritized in a manner that brings the greatest amount of housing opportunities to
the largest number of underclass people. But urban renewal and housing assistance
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became increasingly politicized and racialized throughout the 1960s. The primary
beneficiaries of these new government programs were “senior citizens” and “lowincome families.”9 Since the ghetto underclass mostly consisted of low-income
families, there was a high degree of ethnoracial tension associated with the enactment
of HUD and its designated purpose of eradicating poverty through public housing.
As HUD re-centered the federal government on the ethnoracial tensions
surrounding urban housing, especially in light of the escalating Vietnam War, it
pushed the Johnson administration to enact strong measures for prohibiting racial
discrimination in housing. Originally intended as a follow-up measure to the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which barred discriminatory practices in most areas of American
society, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) provided the legislative
wherewithal necessary to fulfill the basic promise of ending race restrictive housing
covenants by Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948. By ending racial discrimination in housing,
the natural progression would entail a systematic end of segregation in urban
neighborhoods. Yet that progression did not always occur, and in many instances,
inner-city segregation worsened. The ghetto underclass began to develop a sociopolitical disdain for the government‟s inability to address adequately its raciallyinduced problems.
The socio-political disdain for government and its civil rights legislation
among members of the ghetto underclass became endemic after the publication of the
Moynihan Report in 1965. Produced by the Department of Labor under the direction
of future U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, this report “emphasized that family
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deterioration – as revealed in urban blacks‟ rising rates of broken marriages, femaleheaded homes, out-of-wedlock births, and welfare dependency – was one of the
central problems of the black lower class.”10 In effect, “Moynihan‟s unflattering
depiction of the black family in the urban ghetto” demonstrated that there was a
dramatic rift between the white American nuclear family and the largely
dysfunctional African-American family.11 Critics of the Moynihan Report pointed to
its lack of insight on the communal benefits afforded to the residents of a black
ghetto. At times, crowded public housing fostered neighborly cooperation, close
relationships, local patronage, and cultured schools.
In many American cities, congested neighborhoods and single-race schools
were features of both the ghetto underclass and the black middle class. When these
two social classes found common ground in their opposition to government and civil
rights, race riots erupted. And one of the primary questions that followed rioting was
whether segregation or desegregation could be highlighted as the main cause. Yet
what constituted the black middle class? Sociologist Mary Pattillo-McCoy examined
the black middle class in the Groveland neighborhood of Chicago‟s South Side ghetto
and discovered that “being black and middle class” was often more challenging than
being part of the ghetto underclass because racial obstacles became more intense for
those blacks attempting to maintain middle-class status.12
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In Las Vegas and Los Angeles the black middle class typically coexisted
alongside the ghetto underclass. Yet both social classes tended to be viewed by their
respective municipal governments as separate entities. It was the plight of the ghetto
underclass that merited the foremost attention from each city‟s officials, but the black
middle class simultaneously struggled for employment in Las Vegas‟ resort economy
and Los Angeles‟ industrial economy. Ironically, the national welfare reform
measures of the early 1960s, which the ghetto underclass needed, occurred “during an
era of general economic prosperity.”13 These reforms affected local municipalities by
encouraging the elimination of urban poverty through the expansion of
unemployment insurance. This policy was especially pertinent to Las Vegas, as it
could not afford to have either race riots or an outward display of urban poverty due
to its heavy reliance on tourism.

Las Vegas‟ Ghetto Underclass
Since the majority of black Las Vegans arrived in the city either during or
after World War II, there was not an extensive period of time for the ghetto
underclass to meld together prior to the racial disturbances of the 1960s. Los Angeles
was similar in this regard, but its black middle class was much bigger due to a greater
diversity in employment opportunities. The large in-migration of black Las Vegans
during the 1940s resulted from the high demand for labor at the Basic Magnesium
plant in Henderson. And many of the black migrants to the Las Vegas Valley
originated in the Mississippi Delta region of the South, which included the states of
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Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.14 Given their rural and often impoverished
backgrounds as sharecroppers, molding into Las Vegas‟ ghetto underclass required a
vast sociological transition.
One black migrant to the city who underwent this transition was Ruby
Duncan. In 1952, she arrived in Las Vegas on a bus from Tallulah, Louisiana, and
found work cleaning private homes before moving on to the Flamingo hotel.15
Duncan became a member of “Hotel and Culinary Workers Union, Local 226,” which
provided her with a certain degree of job security in addition to basic medical
benefits.16 But union membership for black Las Vegans was still second rate when
compared to white union membership. Partially integrated, Local 226 was one of the
only unions to recruit black members, as its leader in the 1950s, Al Bramlet, “made
repeated trips to small towns in Louisiana and Arkansas, where he promised cotton
pickers and mill-hands wages beyond anything they could hope to make in the
Delta.”17 But until Local 226 “struck an accord with the largest Las Vegas hoteliers,”
work on the Strip proved scarce for black Las Vegans.18
As a member of Local 226, Duncan worked as a hotel maid to support her
family. Apart from a five-year marriage to Roy Duncan in the early 1960s, she was a
single mother of seven. Historian Annelise Orleck has conducted extensive research
on Duncan‟s life and has concluded that although she “had always spoken up for
herself,” Duncan had a proclivity for “being a lone hothead” at times.19 This
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character trait actually helped her when she began to organize against societal
segregation, and subsequently, for welfare rights in the 1960s. Nevertheless, when
the Moynihan Report emerged in 1965, local movements for welfare rights, such as
Duncan‟s in Las Vegas, were stymied to an extent. The report tended to vilify the
black single mother, which it perceived as being increasingly dependent on
government welfare programs.
Although the Moynihan Report mainly discussed welfare rights and their
impact on African-American families at the national level, it spurred local responses.
Dozens of states, counties, and cities slashed their welfare benefits as a partial
reaction to report‟s recommendations. The 1967 race riots in many American cities,
which the Kerner Commission investigated, can even be viewed as a violent response
to the reduction of local welfare programs. Nevada, in particular, passed “a 1967
state law requiring county prosecutors to interrogate every Nevada woman who
applied for [welfare] assistance.”20 At the same time, the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO) formed in Washington, D.C. to push for greater governmental
action in augmenting the welfare rights of women and children. And with astute
coaching by NWRO leaders such as Dr. George Wiley and Johnnie Tillmon, Duncan
became one of the primary leaders in Las Vegas‟ welfare movement.
Modeled after the NWRO, the Clark County Welfare Rights Organization
(CCWRO) elected Duncan as its president in 1969. Along with other Westside
mothers, including Essie Henderson, Rosie Seals, and Alversa Beals, she first
pressured Las Vegas‟ city government and eventually Nevada‟s state government to
help those affected by the recent welfare cuts with food and clothing distribution
20

Orleck, Storming Caesars Palace, 117.

49

centers on the Westside.21 But Duncan‟s appeals went mostly unheard, as welfare
reduction tended to be the dominant public policy on both a national and local level.
For most black Las Vegans, especially single mothers like Duncan, the fight for
welfare rights became a necessary task since employment discrimination in the city‟s
hotels and casinos pushed many of them out of work. Even though unions such as
Local 226 had black members, questions of fairness remained with regard to the job
opportunities available for blacks.
The local culinary and teamster unions began to face increased legal pressure
from the Southern Nevada chapter of the NAACP. In 1967, then lead attorney and
director of the Southern Nevada NAACP, Charles Kellar, blasted Local 226 “and its
secretary-treasurer, Al Bramlet, for failing to push the employment of its black
members.”22 In fact, “Kellar threatened to cut the union down to size by asking the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to decertify it as the hotel workers‟ official
bargaining agent.”23 For Duncan and other welfare advocates in Las Vegas, the
heightened legal pressure on local unions by the Southern Nevada NAACP was a
welcome sign. If welfare rights for black Las Vegans did not become a reality, at
least the opportunity to avoid menial labor and work for a decent wage seemed
plausible in the not-so-distant future.
Yet seven years after Dr. James McMillan and the local NAACP reached an
integration agreement with the city in 1960, black Las Vegans were still protesting.
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Woodrow Wilson, a black community activist from the Westside and former Nevada
State Assemblyman, recalled the importance of the 1960 integration agreement. He
stated:
It was a situation here in Las Vegas, even in the 1950s and early 1960s, before
the accommodation law was passed that no one was working above a porter, a
dishwasher, someone that‟s doing menial jobs [in the city], involved in the
gambling casinos, involved in any other situation Downtown…24
This statement, which occurred at a civil rights forum in 1977, demonstrated the lack
of job opportunities available to black Las Vegans prior to “the confrontation with the
city” in March 1960.25 Wilson continued on to state that the integration agreement
“was brought about by [a] concerted effort” on behalf of the local NAACP and its
original members including Dr. Charles West, Lubertha Johnson, and Bob Bailey.26
But despite the 1960 integration agreement, black Las Vegans and the local NAACP
(now under Kellar‟s leadership in 1967), sought to augment and secure a greater
degree of black civil liberties through the courts.
Even though Nevada passed a strong anti-discrimination law in March 1965,
“many Downtown and Strip hotels continued to discriminate against blacks in
employment.”27 The question of legislating equality was one that Kellar now
challenged by filing a variety of civil complaints and appeals in court. While Kellar
began his legal assault on employment segregation, black Las Vegans protested
outside various hotels and casinos along the Strip. By 1969, these employment
protests eventually carried over into some of the area‟s local high schools including
24
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Rancho High School, Las Vegas High School, Clark High School, and Valley High
School. These school protests, which mimicked race riots, can be explained through
the socio-political process of racial socialization. In effect, the frustrations exhibited
by unemployed black parents became impressed upon their children, who in turn,
released these frustrations at school, often in the form of hallway shoving matches or
schoolyard brawls. But white students also racially antagonized black students by
ridiculing them over the employment struggles of their parents. Finally, in a rigorous
attempt “to end the cycle of violence” in early 1970, school board officials announced
the hiring of more black teachers and administrators.28 If black students witnessed
more black teachers and administrators in the high schools, then the negative feelings
of racial isolation would be somewhat mitigated.

Los Angeles‟ Race Riots
While Las Vegas had a minor riot during World War II and in 1969 a brief,
three-day disturbance in the Westside, Los Angeles endured full-fledged multiethnic
race riots in the 1940s and 1960s. Occasioned by World War II, Los Angeles‟
industrial boom attracted scores of migrants to the city. Whether they were
temporary contract workers from Mexico with the Bracero Program or inner-city
African-Americans from the Southern United States, these migrants brought their
cultural customs, which at times, elicited social friction from white residents.
According to historian Mark Wild, “On almost any level World War II was a
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watershed event in the history of Los Angeles.”29 Both the South Central ghetto and
the Eastside barrio “sprang back to life,” as the demand for wartime laborers in
defense firms saw the momentary relaxation of discriminatory employment
practices.30 Given the looming threat posed by Japan in the Pacific, it was especially
important for the federal government to streamline munitions production by removing
racial barriers in the defense industry. Therefore, in June 1941, President Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 8802, which established “the Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC) to eliminate discrimination in defense plants.”31
In Los Angeles‟ numerous defense plants, however, “race relations were
anything but idyllic.”32 Although World War II initially precipitated a “euphoria of
unity” among the city‟s multiethnic work force, “darker developments” emerged
between workers as the war progressed.33 After the Bracero Program began in
August 1942, thousands of Mexicans arrived in Los Angeles County to perform
agricultural labor. The Program stemmed from a series of diplomatic arrangements
between Mexico and the United States to meet the increased labor demand of wartime
industries. By importing such a large number of Mexican farm workers, more
Americans were able to work in the defense plants. Yet aside from the mass influx of
Mexicans to Los Angeles, the Bracero Program spurred a deep xenophobic reaction
among many white Angelenos. Rooted in widespread racial fears, this reaction
became violent with the Zoot Suit Riots in 1943.
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The Zoot Suit Riots complicated racial perceptions between Mexican and
Anglo Americans.34 Historian Mauricio Mazón argues that it is difficult to classify
the Zoot Suit Riots as “riots” because “no one was killed” and “property damage was
slight.”35 Yet they signified a socio-political coalescence among Mexican-American
youths, which brought a heightened sense of ethnoracial solidarity to the Eastside
barrio. And despite the ability of Mexican Angelenos to parlay their near whiteness
into decent paying jobs at times, many of them still encountered discriminatory
barriers while seeking employment in Los Angeles‟ booming defense industry. Due
to the Bracero Program, there was a societal stereotype that Mexican Angelenos
ought to work strictly as farmhands in order to offer the defense plant jobs to the
city‟s white residents.
The employment-based ethnoracial tensions between Mexican and Anglo
Americans first turned violent in May 1943, but none of the incidents actually
involved zoot-suiters.36 These violent street clashes, which resulted in numerous
deaths, mostly occurred between white Navy servicemen stationed in Los Angeles
and Mexican-American youths. Yet when these Mexican-American youths wore zoot
suits, they became pachucos or punkish gang members in the eyes of local
authorities. Originating with the swing jazz scene of the early 1930s, the zoot suit
was fashionably symbolic for ethnoracial minorities like Mexican Americans because
it reflected the urban subculture surrounding the daily struggles of barrio life. When
Mexican-American youths dressed in zoot suits, they felt distinctly opposed to
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members of the white bourgeoisie who directed most of Los Angeles‟ entrepreneurial
endeavors such as the defense plants. And it was this feeling of socio-political
disparity (class consciousness) that pushed these Mexican-American youths to clash
with those whom they perceived as representing the dominant (white) social order.
But the zoot suit represented more than the rebellious subculture of Los
Angeles‟ Mexican-American youths. In the military, for example, it symbolized
everything “that was morally and politically deficient with the home front” during
World War II.37 Some young Mexican Angelenos, such as Alfred Barela, realized the
societal stigma attached to the zoot suit, and recalled:
Ever since I can remember I‟ve been pushed around and called names because
I‟m a Mexican. I was born in this country… Pretty soon I guess I‟ll be in the
Army and I‟ll be glad to go. But I want to be treated like everybody else.
We‟re tired of being told we can‟t go to this show or that dance because we‟re
Mexican or that we better not be seen on the beach front, or that we can‟t wear
draped pants or have our hair cut the way we want to.38
As a zoot suiter himself, Barela‟s statement captures the ethnoracial angst of the zoot
lifestyle in Mexican-American Los Angeles. Multiform segregation had facilitated
the growth of an ethnoracial tension to the point where violence appeared almost
inevitable. Yet for violence to erupt, there requires a spark. And that spark came on
the night of Thursday, June 3, 1943, when Anglo servicemen encountered a gang of
Mexican zoot suiters in East Los Angeles.
The Anglo servicemen, all of whom were sailors in the Navy, claimed to have
been “jumped and beaten by a gang of at least thirty-five [Mexican] zoot suiters.”39
In response, for the following four days and nights, Anglo servicemen proceeded to
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target and assault both African-American and Mexican-American zoot suiters
throughout Los Angeles. Ethnoracial neighborhoods like the Eastside barrio and the
South Central ghetto became semi-war zones, as officers from the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) frequently swooped in to arrest zoot suiters after they had
already been beaten by throngs of white sailors.40 But the LAPD and “other law
enforcement agencies” received praise from Governor Earl Warren for their roles in
“breaking up the tense situation” surrounding the riots.41 In short, there was a general
consensus, especially in the local media, which painted the ethnoracial zoot suiters as
the riots‟ perpetrators and the Anglo servicemen as its victims.
Even though a majority of the zoot suiters targeted by the servicemen were
Mexican Americans, there were still many African Americans involved in the riots.
To downplay the role of race in the Zoot Suit disturbances, Mayor Fletcher Bowron
cited the pernicious increase of gang activity among Los Angeles‟ youths as the main
problem behind the city‟s street violence.42 He did so to preserve the city‟s racially
tolerant image in an attempt to attract more minority workers and convince the
Roosevelt Administration that, unlike Detroit and other martial cities where racism
prevailed, wartime Los Angeles was not another bastion of Jim Crow. Although
rioting happened throughout Los Angeles, the Eastside barrio and the South Central
ghetto (Watts) were areas of heightened ethnoracial conflict. In particular, Rev.
Francisco Quintanilla, who was a pastor at the Mexican Methodist Church in Watts,
preached about the negative publicity that the riots brought to both Mexicans and
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blacks in his community.43 In effect, Watts was in the process of becoming a
multiethnic community, but the ethnoracial skirmishes associated with the Zoot Suit
Riots had left a socio-political wound that would later be reopened in 1965.
By the time of the Watts Riots in August 1965, the South Central ghetto had
become somewhat of an afterthought for city officials. Urban renewal plans mainly
centered on public housing projects in the Pacoima district of the San Fernando
Valley, and even those did not seem plausible until the federal government intervened
in the early 1960s. Similarly, African-American lawmaker William Byron Rumford
introduced a fair housing bill to the California legislature, which sought to equalize
housing access for ethnoracial groups (and other underrepresented minorities) by
prohibiting discrimination in the housing process. After the bill became law, the
Rumford Fair Housing Act faced intense resistance, especially from real estate
associations.44 This resistance resulted in a 1964 ballot measure (Proposition 14) to
amend the California Constitution and overturn the new law. Although Proposition
14 passed with a large majority in the 1964 state elections, it was eventually ruled
unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in 1966 and the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1967.
Yet aside from Proposition 14, which partially precipitated the ethnoracial
tensions of the 1965 Watts Riots, other socio-political factors were affecting black
Los Angeles. In a 1972 case study, Frederick Case found that “business
opportunities” for black capitalists living in the South Central ghetto were nearly non-
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existent.45 The idea of a black “small businessman” in Watts during the 1960s was
anachronistic since the early examples of communal patronage in the ghetto‟s
formative years (1920s and 1930s) had become replaced by governmental agencies
such as the Small Business Administration (SBA).46 Despite the purpose of these
governmental agencies to provide small businesses with advice and credit, they
mostly avoided urban ghettos like South Central because they deemed the small
businesses there too “high-risk.”47 In short, small-business capitalism in black
ghettos like Watts was the first casualty of the new urban economics forged in the
post-World War II period.
As Carl Abbott and other historians have noted, progressive-minded business
elites gradually took control of Western city governments during and after World War
II.48 It was not for new factories that these elites cleared space, but for office
buildings and other structures serving America‟s growing service-sector economy.
This urban renewal process ultimately provided thousands of new jobs for mostly
white, college-educated workers. Yet “the economic plight of [urban] black
communities,” which partly stemmed from deindustrialization, could not be
prevented by the mere presence of these revitalization programs.49 Apart from these
programs, it was the lack of black-owned businesses in Watts that contributed greatly
to the high unemployment rate of African Americans in South Central. And
governmental efforts “to foster minority capitalism” through improvement programs
45

Frederick E. Case, Black Capitalism: Problems in Development: A Case Study of Los Angeles (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 71.
46
Case, Black Capitalism, 71.
47
Case, Black Capitalism, 71.
48
Carl Abbott, How Cities Won the West: Four Centuries of Urban Change in Western North America
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 199.
49
Case, Black Capitalism, ix.

58

in areas like Watts “have ignored, or been oblivious to, the economics of job
creation” and “minority employability.”50
With black frustrations mounting over the dearth of economic opportunities in
Watts, ethnoracial tensions were high. The potential for rioting existed on multiple
socio-political levels, as black workers and white authorities (LAPD, city officials)
were growing increasingly antagonistic. And like the Zoot Suit Riots, a distinctive
spark set off the Watts Riots. On the night of August 11, 1965, an African-American
man named Marquette Frye faced arrest after being pulled over by the LAPD for
driving while intoxicated. His arrest brought scores of Watts‟ residents into the
streets, as a police struggle ensued with Frye and his family. Rumors of police
brutality began to spread throughout South Central and “crowds of angry blacks”
started torching homes and businesses over “a 46-square mile inner-city area.”51
Mayor Sam Yorty‟s response was simple but somewhat ineffective: bring in the
National Guard and hold a curfew. Coincidentally, close to “70 percent of Los
Angeles County‟s 650,000 blacks” lived inside the boundaries of that 46-square mile
zone.52
After nearly 40 deaths and 4,000 arrests, the Watts Riots, which lasted for six
days, had taken both a physical and mental toll on Los Angeles and her residents. A
majority of Angelenos “had regarded their community as immune to this kind of
violent disturbance.”53 Whether the Watts Riots resulted from inadequate municipal
services, i.e., schools, infrastructure, and transportation, or the lack of economic and

50

Case, Black Capitalism, 76.
Case, Black Capitalism, 3.
52
Case, Black Capitalism, 3.
53
Case, Black Capitalism, 3.
51

59

housing opportunities for black Angelenos, the recurring theme of the ghetto
underclass (inner-city poor) remained present.54 In a December 1965 report by the
Governor‟s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission), three
potential causes of the riots received attention. The first was the fact that Los
Angeles‟ black population had “increased almost tenfold from 75,000 in 1940 to
650,000 in 1965.”55 The second entailed the ethnoracial controversy of Proposition
14 and the Rumford Fair Housing Act while the third highlighted the near parity of
Watts‟ black and Mexican populations.56 This last demographic point concerning
black and Mexican Angelenos was particularly important because it demonstrated the
extent of ethnoracial competition for jobs and housing in South Central.
The near parity of Watts‟ black and Mexican populations by the mid-1960s
pushed many black Angelenos to adopt some of basic the tenets surrounding the
Black Power movement. With an emphasis on the culture of blackness, the Black
Power movement sought to uplift African Americans by utilizing black history to
chart a path to self-sufficiency in black communities. A black resident of South
Central, Robert Mason, explained the Watts Riots from a Black Power perspective:
My thought is that any black community has to go through three different
stages. Number one is the destructive stage, in the case of Watts the „65
revolution. The second stage would be the unity stage, with the idea of selfreliance and socio-economic independence of the black community. Number
three would be integration or, at least, peaceful coexistence. But at this
particular point in time, black people realize that there is no such thing as
integration. Integration has to be done on the [white] man‟s terms. It means
54
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accepting the society and accepting white values and white laws. But this isn‟t
us.57
Mason‟s explanation signified the anti-integration stance assumed by most Black
Power advocates. As a socio-political process, the integration of Watts had failed.
And it failed precisely because it was never actually attempted in the first place.
Adequate municipal services were practically non-existent while black schools often
faced closure without being rearranged to reflect the main tenets of racial integration.
In brief, the development of a mutual respect between black and white Angelenos still
remained at large in the 1960s.
Developing mutual respect among black and white Angelenos initially
required the recognition of inequality as a problem. And from that recognition,
Angelenos can begin to connect inequality with race. One South Central resident,
Paul Williams, understood the problem that emerged when attempting to connect race
and inequality in a black ghetto like Watts:
But the problem, as it exists now, is black people in this country, and I‟m
black, so I‟m part of the problem. You live with the problem, you die with the
problem, you think with the problem, you do everything with the problem. I
think I have a unique responsibility. I don‟t know if it‟s to my people, for my
people, whatever, but I kind of think more than just about my family – I think
about everybody in the neighborhood.58
Williams‟ remarks were reminiscent of Norman Rockwell‟s 1960 painting of Ruby
Bridges (The Problem We All Live With) where she is depicted on the first day of
school integration in New Orleans. In effect, many black residents of Watts felt a
communal responsibility to maintain their neighborhood‟s security, and thus, the
Watts Riots were troubling. There was plenty of culpability for the riots to be
57
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allocated, but the American societal consciousness had already determined that innercity blacks were the primary problem.
Black frustrations constituted the main reasons behind the designation of
black Angelenos as the primary problem of the Watts Riots. These frustrations
continued for years after the riots. They mostly stemmed from Watts‟ “high black
unemployment” rate “and an increasing shortage of affordable housing [for blacks] in
Los Angeles.”59 Despite the limited socio-economic opportunities for many of Watts‟
black residents, most of them “do not seem to be eager to move out of the area.”60
Yet although Watts became increasingly multiethnic in the years following the riots,
there was still a collective feeling among African Americans of being “trapped in
their neighborhood,” which consequently resulted in a downward sense of social
mobility (proletarianization) for black Angelenos throughout the city.61 In short,
perhaps the Watts Riots‟ most indelible feature entailed the attention that it brought to
the afflictions of the ghetto underclass in urban environments.

Conclusion
Overall, urban crises erupted in Las Vegas and Los Angeles during and after
World War II. They mainly consisted of race riots that stemmed from a frustrated
ghetto underclass. Comprised of inner-city African Americans, the ghetto underclass
experienced limited socio-economic opportunities. But in Los Angeles, there also
existed a barrio underclass in which many Mexican-American males found communal
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solidarity in the zoot suit lifestyle. From housing shortages to job discrimination to
underperforming schools, Las Vegas‟ Westside and Los Angeles‟ Watts constituted
epicenters for the failings of municipal governance. Frequently, the police were the
only consistent municipal service afforded to the residents in each city‟s ghetto.
Given that roads often went unpaved and sewer systems were ill-maintained, the
ghetto‟s basic infrastructure left much to be desired. At the same time, it was the lack
of adequate municipal services that rallied the ghetto underclass to embrace their
disadvantaged status as a fundamental component of black culture. At the very least,
the ghetto represented a definitive urban space that inner-city African Americans
could call their own.
As basic socio-political and ethnoracial components of the inner city, ghettos
and barrios have become stigmatized at times by historians, economists, politicians,
and sociologists alike. Through the analytic frame of economic restructuring, which
can otherwise be referred to as deindustrialization, everyday residents of the ghetto
and barrio were often considered pawns in a larger structural process. The key
therefore to uncovering the ghetto/barrio underclass and their collective role in each
city‟s race riots was to analyze the personal statements of people such as Woodrow
Wilson in Las Vegas or Alfred Barela in Los Angeles. Their statements, along with
others by ghetto/barrio residents, offer special insight into how ethnoracial conflicts
occurred in the context of underprivileged urban environments. In the end, both
cities‟ race riots made the ghetto/barrio underclass a visible yet isolated sociopolitical entity that demanded the attention of all city residents in order to reconcile.
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CHAPTER 4
AGAINST ALL INSTINCTS: MANDATORY BUSING AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LAS VEGAS
AND LOS ANGELES, 1950 – 1980
Introduction
Mandatory busing and school desegregation in Las Vegas and Los Angeles
were intricate by-products of the Civil Rights Movement. Each city‟s mandatory
busing experiments constituted a visceral reaction to the larger process of societal
segregation. In general, societal segregation entailed a systematic separation of the
races, so that one social group could maintain certain privileges over the other(s).
While school desegregation sought to undo separation between the races, school
integration attempted to smooth over the crudeness of desegregation by creating
adequate racial balances.1 During the twentieth-century, Americans saw a wall of
separation between blacks and whites. Otherwise called Jim Crow, this wall divided
blacks and whites to the point where blacks became second-class citizens. Therefore,
I believe that rectifying the negative effects of racial segregation required a drastic
measure, and forced busing surely qualified as such.
Undoing societal segregation was a daunting endeavor. Civil rights
organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) did not necessarily know where to begin at first. By the 1950s, racial
segregation existed at virtually every level of American society including
1
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neighborhoods, jobs, hotels, buses, trains, theaters, and schools. With their varied
understandings of constitutional law in hand, NAACP legal pioneers such as
Thurgood Marshall and Julius Chambers decided that schools were the most logical
places to initiate desegregation. Public education was an agent of fundamental
change, and thus, teaching young children in integrated schools to respect not only
themselves, but also their fellow students was vital to the working order of a
republican society like the United States.

Historiographical Debate and Psychological Dilemma
To understand forced busing in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, it is important to
examine the historiography and psychology surrounding school desegregation.
Integrating the public schools required a certain “will to power” in America‟s black
community.2 The will to power was “simply the will to life,” and black Americans
certainly exhibited this trait in the face of societal segregation.3 As second-class
citizens, they pushed for dynamic change within the heart of American democracy:
the public schools. The separate-but-equal doctrine, which originated with the 1896
Plessy v. Ferguson Supreme Court case, proved a serious bane in African-American
life. In the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case, however, the Court overturned
the separate-but-equal doctrine after ruling that segregated schools were
unconstitutional. Despite Brown II (1955), which ordered school desegregation
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efforts to occur “with all deliberate speed,” for the next ten years the Warren Court
and federal district court judges in the South issued numerous rulings that reinforced
the first Brown decision. But real progress in school integration did not happen in
cities like Los Angeles until the mid-to-late 1960s when the federal government
encouraged school districts to integrate by tying Great Society funds to compliance.
The Brown decision altered the landscape of American race relations. For
critical race theorist, Derrick Bell, the central question facing Chief Justice Earl
Warren was whether or not the racial segregation of children in elementary and
secondary schools generated “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”4 Spearheading the legal arguments for the plaintiffs was NAACP attorney
Thurgood Marshall, who contended that “separate educational facilities” were
“inherently unequal,” and thus, they violated “the plaintiffs‟ rights under the equal
protection clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.5 Adding
weight to Marshall‟s arguments were the testimonies of noted African-American
psychologists, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, who conducted “doll tests” with black and
white children to determine the extent of ingrained racial prejudices for young school
students.6 Their findings showed a clear preference among both black and white
children for the white doll, which in turn, indicated “a fundamental conflict at the
very foundation of the ego structure.”7
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For the Warren Court, school segregation perpetuated feelings of inferiority
amid black children. Consuming the black psyche were notions of self-hatred,
frustration, and fear.8 According to historian Daryl Michael Scott, whiteness became
the norm for blacks to the point where it was perfectly natural for blacks to idealize
white culture.9 Such a practice, however, only “proved to be a fatal psychological
poison,” as white standards were simply unattainable for blacks.10 Having considered
the psychological aspects of school segregation, the Warren Court voted unanimously
to end racial discrimination in America‟s public schools. Yet after a year, the Warren
Court heard arguments regarding the implementation process of its original ruling.
The outcome of these hearings was Brown II (1955), which in effect, asserted that the
first Brown decision “was more symbolic than real” in its monumental claims for
school integration.11
Brown II set a dangerous precedent. It placed the responsibility of school
desegregation in the hands of local school boards.12 In doing so, it gave the local
school boards complete autonomy over how the integration process would occur.
Chief Justice Warren opined that district courts and local school authorities must
work in conjunction with each other and act “with all deliberate speed” to eradicate
racial segregation in the public schools.13 The Supreme Court‟s actions, therefore,
permitted an indefinite delay with respect to implementing desegregation. If the first
Brown ruling constituted a national call for desegregation, Brown II almost certainly
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made that call into a regional plea. Local school boards, especially in the South,
could easily employ the local autonomy granted to them by Brown II to gerrymander
their districts so that whites and blacks remained segregated. By the early 1970s, it
was clear that drastic measures were necessary to combat the stagnated integration
process. One such measure included busing, which first came to prominence in
Charlotte, North Carolina.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court
ruled busing constitutional. This 1971 decision established a national precedent for
mandatory busing as a means to affect urban integration. It also signaled a reversal of
sentiment among the nine justices sitting in the now Warren Burger Supreme Court.
When President Richard Nixon appointed Burger as Chief Justice in 1969, he
intended to inject a conservative sentiment into the Court. As an advocate of judicial
restraint, Burger seemed to be the answer for Nixon. Even so, Burger quickly found
himself at the center of a judicially active Court, especially concerning the issue of
school desegregation. With the Swann ruling, Charlotte became “the national test
case for busing.”14 Given that Jim Crow segregation was particularly deep-seated
throughout the South, desegregation busing became the city‟s “proudest
achievement” during the 1970s.15 Yet busing in Charlotte did not commence in a
harmonious fashion; it entailed “boycotts and white flight and violence day after day
in the schools.”16 The Las Vegas busing decision came one year after Swann in 1972
while the Los Angeles case arrived two years after Milliken in 1976.
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With Milliken the threat of resegregating America‟s public schools became a
stark reality. The Supreme Court curtailed inter-school-district busing by requiring
hard evidence of deliberately-pursued segregation policies in multiple school
districts.17 Thus, multidistrict busing could no longer serve as a remedy for one
school district‟s segregation problems. The Milliken case specifically involved the
Detroit Board of Education (DBOE), which “maintained optional attendance zones”
in 53 separate school districts throughout the city‟s metropolitan area.18 Such a
practice, argued the NAACP, was conducive to the sociological phenomenon known
as “white flight” where the newer schools built in Detroit‟s outlying neighborhoods
tended to be “one-race schools” for whites.19 The conditions fostered under these
circumstances were particularly harmful to Detroit‟s inner-city black population.
They faced cultural isolation, especially since the DBOE “never bused white children
to predominantly black schools.”20 To the extent that Milliken perpetuated the
process of ghetto formation for Detroit‟s blacks, it symbolized a step backward for
American school desegregation. And the psychological implications of the inner-city
isolation that it spawned were widespread.
One of the major psychological implications associated with the inner-city
was fear. As prominent social psychologist Gordon Allport argued, segregation, as a
racial process rooted in fear, “is a form of discrimination that sets up spatial
boundaries of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of members of an out-
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group.”21 African Americans were the archetypal out-group who had to confront the
negative side-effects of their history as slaves and the generalized stigmas concerning
their physical anatomy. For Allport, “it is the rule in American cities to find Negroes
living in segregated regions” where basic social accommodations like housing and
schools were of significantly less quality than those of whites.22 With the guise of
“preferential thinking,” a “group-norm theory of prejudice” emerged where all social
groups “develop a way of living with characteristic codes and beliefs, standards and
enemies to suit their own adaptive needs.”23 Nowhere was this theory more evident
than in America‟s public schools.
Public education is one of the cruxes of American democracy. It places
children at the center of society.24 Kenneth Clark claimed that schools define the
collective sentiments of a community, as they “change their policies from traditional
to progressive or vice versa in order to meet the needs of the children.”25 Under Jim
Crow, however, “racial symbols” were “so prevalent” in America‟s public schools
that even young children recognized them.26 Exposing children to school segregation
meant indoctrinating them with attitudes of superiority or inferiority toward other
races. Such a practice was counter-productive for not only school desegregation, but
also for the attainment of values expressed in the “American Creed,” namely equality
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and liberty.27 Moreover, through parental socialization, a young child begins to
construct ideas of race that reflect those held by his parents. The degree to which
parents impose disciplinary measures on their child often ascertains the level of
prejudices employed by that child.28 Thus, if parents are quick to enforce harsh
punishments on their child, then the child is more likely to cultivate “intense
prejudices toward individuals of another race.”29
Overall, the historiographical debate and psychological dilemma of school
desegregation centered on attempting to engender a cross-racial acceptance.
Although fear constituted a permanent side-effect of the school desegregation
process, it nevertheless helped to expose the various problems associated with
segregated schools. Such problems included the racial imbalances between black and
white schools and the resultant disparities in per-pupil spending among those
schools.30 For the most part, school integration marked both “an educational success”
and “a political failure.”31 It succeeded educationally in the sense that members of all
races gained an equal opportunity to improve themselves through academic
achievement.32 But it failed politically because most of the major decisions
surrounding the school desegregation process occurred at the hands of local school
27
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boards whose largely white members instituted reforms at their own pace and with
their own interests in mind.33

Busing in Las Vegas
In the Western United States, school integration resembled the process in the
South. Insofar as Charlotte embodied the ideal model of desegregation busing with
its large, consolidated school district, Las Vegas served as an intriguing case study
from which the school integration process for Western cities could be examined. And
as a distinctly Western city, Las Vegas developed much later than its Eastern
counterparts. If World War I brought African Americans from the South to the
North, then World War II facilitated African-American migration from the East to the
West. The Hoover Dam‟s completion in 1936, along with “an air base, a magnesium
plant, and a new suburb to house defense workers” by 1942, meant that Las Vegas
was quickly becoming a metropolitan area.34
Urbanization in Las Vegas could not have taken place without “federal
spending, and lots of it.”35 This high degree of federal spending under President
Franklin Roosevelt‟s New Deal primarily targeted public works projects, which in
turn, generated a high demand for labor. Employment opportunities, therefore,
became available for both black and white workers. But “by the late 1930s, despite
their growing importance to the community‟s infant resort industry, blacks faced
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more segregationist barriers.”36 These barriers included “being denied service not
only in hotels, but also in a growing number of restaurants and stores.”37 Jim Crow
further manifested itself when white city officials, anxious to please Southern white
dam workers, sought to rid Downtown of black business owners through a variety of
informal actions.38 Such actions entailed the systematic refusal of city hall “to renew
the licenses of black-owned businesses” in the Downtown district unless the owners
“relocated to the Westside.”39
Due to these unofficial social zoning procedures, Las Vegas‟ Westside
became a black ghetto by the early 1940s. Its land values were “chronically low,” as
the area “somehow eluded the building boom occasioned by the Hoover Dam.”40
Historian Eugene Moehring argued that “police patrols were almost the only symbols
of the city‟s presence in the Westside.”41 The district faced the prospects of complete
abandonment by the city, especially when considering the blatant lack of adequate
municipal services.42 Yet the most glaring detriment of the Westside was the
condition of its schools. Similar to the situation that sparked Brown, segregation
existed primarily in the elementary schools.43 The main question, however, was
whether or not the Clark County School District (CCSD) (and its pre-1956
counterpart, the Las Vegas Union School District) should be held responsible for the
de facto segregation in the Westside‟s schools.
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Segregation in the Westside permeated all levels of its tight-knit ghetto
society. Black residents patronized black businesses, which spurred the growth of a
strong race-based loyalty. Ethnic bonds, particularly in the context of a segmented
labor force, tended to trump any kind of overarching class consciousness within the
boundaries of the Westside. In fact, black Las Vegans faced both residential and
commercial confinement between the North-South barriers of Owens Avenue and
Bonanza Road with Avenue A and Martin Luther King Boulevard (formerly
Highland Avenue) as the East-West boundaries, respectively (See Map I in
Appendix).44 The Westside‟s confined nature undoubtedly had major psychological
repercussions for its black residents. Racially restrictive housing covenants
contributed to a sense of entrapment, as blacks felt gradually more encircled by
whites. By the 1960s, residential segregation in the Westside was a seemingly
indelible fact of life. And black Las Vegans were becoming increasingly frustrated
over the segregated conditions that they endured on a daily basis.
Tensions over jobs, housing, and discrimination grew throughout the 1960s,
reaching a boiling point in 1968. The Southern Nevada chapter of the NAACP
finally decided to move against the school segregation problem in the Westside. As
the nation‟s foremost civil rights organization, the NAACP believed that school
desegregation ought to be one of the biggest priorities in combating the larger system
of societal segregation.45 Just one year prior, however, black attorney, Charles
Kellar, filed a legal complaint regarding job discrimination in Las Vegas‟ “culinary
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and teamsters unions.”46 If attacking labor segregation was for the black adults, then
tackling school segregation was for the black children. The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (LDF) comprised a separate entity designed specifically for the purpose of
combating segregation through the judicial system.47 Having initially started as the
legal branch of the NAACP in 1910, the LDF gained independent status in 1957.48
Headquartered in New York City, the LDF oversees and maintains local branches in
regions like Southern Nevada (Clark County) throughout the United States.49 Thus,
the LDF carried out the actual litigation process for desegregation cases, such as the
1954 Brown decision, which Thurgood Marshall argued before he became a Supreme
Court Justice in 1967.50
It was under the guidance of Marshall that Kellar came to Las Vegas in
1960.51 Determined to integrate the city‟s black community, he became the lead
attorney and president of the local NAACP by 1967.52 Like most NAACP lawyers,
Kellar possessed expert knowledge of constitutional and civil rights law. And after
Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he “believed that the law was on his
side.”53 According to Title IV of the 1964 law, “We [Congress] have tried to point
out that the progress in school desegregation so well commenced in the period 195457 has been grinding to a halt.”54 Kellar intended to jumpstart the school integration
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process on a local level in Las Vegas by filing a class-action lawsuit against the
CCSD in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada on May 13, 1968.55 Although
the CCSD had somewhat anticipated the legal action taken by Kellar and the
NAACP, it had made little progress in developing a comprehensive and reasonable
school integration policy.56
Headed by future Nevada Governor, Kenny Guinn, the CCSD was responsible
for educating all of the children in Clark County aged 6 to 18. As the Superintendent
from 1969 to 1978, Guinn oversaw a majority of the desegregation process. He
asserted that the primary cause of the racial segregation in the Westside‟s elementary
schools “was more geographic” than political or lawful.57 Echoing these sentiments
was the lead attorney for the CCSD, Robert Petroni. He contended that the CCSD did
not have “to integrate racially imbalanced schools because the district did not create
the imbalance.”58 Kellar, on the other hand, argued that the burden of school
desegregation rested with the CCSD regardless of what gave rise to the segregation in
the Westside.59 Besides, Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act explicitly stated that
the NAACP should not have “to take the lead” in desegregating America‟s public
schools through costly litigation.60
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Known as Kelly v. Clark County School District, the Las Vegas school
integration case proved to be a costly endeavor.61 The litigation process spanned four
years from 1968 to 1972. In the lawsuit, Kellar claimed that the constitutional rights
of black Las Vegans, particularly those granted in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, had been knowingly and willingly violated by the CCSD‟s refusal to
adopt an adequate desegregation plan.62 After years of delay, the CCSD proposed the
“Sixth Grade Center Plan” (SGCP) which provided that the six elementary schools in
the Westside become sixth grade classrooms that black and white students attended
from “open zones” throughout Las Vegas.63 These open zones, which did not cover
all of Clark County, initially hinted that the SGCP was voluntary.64 In fact,
Superintendent Guinn asserted that the CCSD originally thought of desegregating on
a voluntary basis through the use of magnet schools.65 Yet the SGCP‟s voluntary
nature soon became mandatory when in February 1972, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ordered busing as the primary mechanism for integrating the city‟s black
and white communities. In Swann‟s aftermath, school integration, for the courts,
effectively meant forced busing, as they deemed it the only plausible way to rectify
the racial imbalances that existed in segregated schools.66
The transition from voluntary to mandatory busing was an issue that inspired
much resistance. Many white parents simply refused to send their children to
61
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integrated schools. Forced busing posed a serious threat to the status quo that middle
class whites were determined to preserve. Therefore, according to Superintendent
Guinn, “the burden of busing was on the black community” in Las Vegas.67 For
black students living in the Westside, the SGCP obligated them to be bused out of the
area for “all but one of the 12 mandated years of schooling.”68 Aside from the sixth
grade year, which involved whites being bused to the Westside, black students had to
endure one-way busing to white schools. But “the general feeling in the black
community was that this inconvenience was better than segregation.”69 Eleven years
of one-way busing, however, constituted more than just an inconvenience for black
students. In white schools, they experienced social isolation as an out-group.
Psychologically, such a process could only harm the black children‟s collective selfesteem. Not seeing black teachers or administrators had affected the motivation of
black students.70 Indeed, the CCSD‟s Task Force on Integration pointed precisely to
this idea in 1969 when its report stated that black “children should be able to see
black people in positions of day-to-day power and authority.”71 Unfortunately, oneway busing prevented this necessary step in the school desegregation process from
happening.
Segregated schools and one-way busing eroded any semblance of stability
within the CCSD. In 1969, race riots erupted at various high schools across the Las
Vegas Valley.72 CCSD officials scrambled to modify and implement the SGCP
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during the litigation process in order to avoid contributing to the growing violence.
One of the primary points of concern involved the sheer financial costs attached to the
SGCP. A year after the Kelly decision, in 1973, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights published a report entitled “School Desegregation in Ten Communities,”
which investigated the economics behind the SGCP.73 In effect, the CCSD‟s “197273 budget of approximately $64 million” incurred supplemental costs of around $2
million related to just “desegregating the elementary schools.”74 Thirty new buses “each costing $18,000 apiece”- joined the CCSD‟s fleet strictly for the purpose of
handling “the increase in the number of students” bused to school under the SGCP.75
In response to the enormous supplemental costs and perceived violent side
effects of mandatory busing, an ideology of reactionary populism emerged within the
city‟s white community. The Las Vegas Review-Journal carried more stories related
to busing opposition just prior to the opening of the 1972-73 school year, which was
the first year of the SGCP. One story that proved particularly contentious entailed a
statement from the Deputy Superintendent of the CCSD, Clifford Lawrence, in which
he claimed that “the busing moratorium bill passed by Congress and signed by
President Nixon” provided a stay for the school district.76 This article incited a
controversial string of events that nearly led to a Supreme Court hearing. Generally
speaking, the CCSD threatened not to implement the SGCP due to developments in
the legislative proceedings of Congress and the Nixon administration. Such a threat
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was not welcome in either the courts or Las Vegas‟ black community. A public
outcry quickly ensued.
The public outrage stemming from Deputy Superintendent Lawrence‟s
comments spurred the courts to act. Federal district judge, Bruce Thompson, ordered
the CCSD officials “to appear in court to explain why they should not be held in
contempt of court” over their “intended violation” of the Kelly ruling.77 According to
that August 1972 Review-Journal article, Deputy Superintendent Lawrence believed
that Nixon‟s busing moratorium bill acted as a hold on the SGCP.78 Although the
CCSD committed a “constitutional violation” by not adhering to the provisions
stipulated in Swann, the Kelly decision clearly stated that Nixon‟s busing moratorium
was not self-executing.79 Therefore, at the heart of this dilemma sat the U.S.
Constitution. The plaintiffs (NAACP) were abiding by the courts while the
defendants (CCSD) were following the executive and legislative branches. Was the
Kelly case single-handedly dissolving the system of checks and balances within
America‟s governmental structure? If nothing else, urban desegregation busing, as
typified by plans like the SGCP, struck at the core of what American democracy truly
signified.
The SGCP went into effect in September 1972. Judge Thompson denied the
CCSD‟s motion of appeal regarding a stay on busing.80 But a populist group called
Bus-Out began to rally around the anti-busing cause.81 For the most part, Bus-Out
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firmly adhered to Nixon‟s busing moratorium bill, which disallowed the
“transportation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbalances” in the
public schools.82 In demonstrating their opposition to the SGCP, Bus-Out sued the
CCSD and asked for an injunction from the courts to stop forced busing.83 Given the
controversial nature of busing, grassroots organizations such as Bus-Out were not
unique to Las Vegas. In the end, Bus-Out failed to prevent the SGCP from moving
forward because the courts declined to hear their lawsuit. As the CCSD prepared to
integrate the Westside‟s schools through busing, there was an aura of nervous
anticipation that surrounded Las Vegas in the fall of 1972. The potential for racial
disturbances over the SGCP was high, but most city residents understood its
importance for race relations, and thus, they endured. Moreover, the suburban cities
of Henderson and Boulder City as well as unincorporated communities south of Las
Vegas were not in the mandated busing zone, so there were enclaves where middle
class white families could flee to escape the traumas of mandatory busing.

Busing in Los Angeles
As in Las Vegas, mandatory busing in Los Angeles entailed the movement of
black students from an area of high concentration to an area of low concentration.
Unlike Las Vegas, however, Los Angeles‟ mandatory busing plan also included
Hispanic (Mexican) students. It represented a larger sociological diffusion of ethnic
minorities. According to historian Josh Sides, racially restrictive housing covenants,
which the 1948 Supreme Court case Shelley v. Kraemer deemed constitutional yet
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unenforceable by the judicial process, were “the most entrenched barrier[s] to
neighborhood integration.”84 And since the Los Angeles Unified School District
(LAUSD) maintained a neighborhood school policy, residential desegregation
essentially translated into school integration. For African Americans living in
postwar Los Angeles, “residential integration was always about more than just
owning property -- it was about dignity, opportunity, and their children‟s future.”85
Los Angeles‟ black community traditionally faced racial confinement along
Central Avenue south of Downtown. The 1920s saw a huge effort, through housing
covenants, to confine African Americans in this particular area.86 But in the postwar
era, black Angelenos “wanted to move out of areas where they had traditionally been
concentrated.”87 Their collective drive to suburbanize met fierce resistance,
especially from “the white working-class suburbs surrounding the South Central”
black ghetto.88 For white suburban Southern Californians, residential and school
desegregation posed a serious threat to the moral, aesthetical, and financial well-being
of their neighborhoods and schools.89 Even white Angelenos joined the antiintegration movement by forming the Committee against Integration and
Intermarriage (CII).90 By the early 1960s, Los Angeles‟ blacks were becoming
increasingly marginalized due to the complete segregation of their community.
Making matters worse was the relative ineffectiveness of Los Angeles‟
NAACP. After the Brown decision, school desegregation moved at an extremely
84
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slow pace in the city. Critical race theorist, Derrick Bell, suggested that integration
efforts only happened if they served the larger interests of the country.91 Given the
importance of the defense industry in postwar Los Angeles Bell‟s “interestconvergence principle” was particularly pertinent to the city‟s race relations during
the Cold War.92 The Soviets could easily point to the overt contradiction in American
democracy where blacks endured the detriments of second-class citizenship in a
society that professed the equality of all. Chief Justice and former California
Governor, Earl Warren, regarded this paradox as damaging to the aims of American
foreign policy, and as a threat to U.S. national security interests.93 If Brown initiated
the school integration process for the nation; it would take another court case to
desegregate the public schools on a local basis in Los Angeles.
The Los Angeles school integration case became known as Crawford v. Board
of Education of the City of Los Angeles. It originally began as a class-action lawsuit
filed against the LAUSD by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in August
1963.94 Yet the case did not receive a final ruling until June 1976.95 Undoubtedly,
the thirteen-year litigation process had negative consequences for Los Angeles‟
school desegregation. In a way, the LAUSD sought to draw out the case for as long
as possible in an attempt to delay the adoption of an integration plan. As evidenced
by Ronald Reagan‟s successful gubernatorial election in 1966, California faced a
rising tide of “white conservatism,” which stood to hamper school desegregation
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efforts across the state.96 Since the LAUSD refused to integrate its schools, the
school district, in short, became an emblem of this resurging conservative reaction to
judicially active courts.
Originally argued in Los Angeles Superior Court, the Crawford case faced an
uphill battle from the start. In 1970, Judge Alfred Gitelson, a magistrate sympathetic
to school integration, ordered the LAUSD “to prepare and implement a reasonably
feasible plan for the desegregation of its schools.”97 Yet the LAUSD appealed the
ruling to the California Supreme Court, which later affirmed Judge Gitelson‟s
decision.98 The outcome of the Crawford case held vast implications for Los
Angeles, as a massive integration plan covering “nearly 62,000 elementary school
children” was to go into effect during the 1977-78 school year.99 With a mixture of
voluntary and mandatory elements, the LAUSD‟s desegregation plan became the
largest of its type. Like the CCSD, the LAUSD initially emphasized the use of
magnet schools for integration. But the courts swiftly dismissed that method of
desegregation, especially since many white parents chose not to send their children to
magnet schools. In addition, both the CCSD and the LAUSD targeted multiple
elementary school grade levels for mandatory desegregation busing.
For a school district encompassing some 710 square miles, magnet schools
made sense from a practical viewpoint.100 They were schools that attracted students,
regardless of race or gender, for specific vocational purposes. Although critics
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contended that magnet schools merely served as instruments for maintaining
segregated schools, proponents saw them as places where a diverse student body
could gain valuable vocational experience. The problem, of course, was that magnet
school attendance occurred on a voluntary basis. In a school district as large as the
LAUSD, mandatory measures were necessary to affect any kind of broad-based
change. And such change had to occur first in the elementary schools, which
represented the highest degree of segregation in the district‟s schools at about 60
percent.101 Therefore, as a minimum objective, the LAUSD had to integrate “at least
50 of the 264 segregated elementary schools” in the district through forced busing. 102
This minimum objective amounted to about 19% of the LAUSD‟s schools with
segregation problems.
The California Supreme Court actually mandated this minimum objective, but
left the Los Angeles Superior Court to monitor compliance.103 Judge Paul Egly
oversaw the development and implementation of the LAUSD‟s integration plan.104
Some black activists even wanted him to design the plan, however, that option proved
too controversial to be viable.105 Instead, the LAUSD formed a special committee to
draw up the eventual desegregation policy. Known as the Citizens‟ Advisory
Committee on Student Integration (CACSI), its primary mission was “to reduce racial
isolation” in Los Angeles‟ public schools through a workable integration strategy.106
The first recommendations from CACSI to the LAUSD came in August 1976. They
101
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included “a proposal to expand the Permits with Transportation (PWT) program,”
which was the busing component of the desegregation plan.107 Unfortunately, the
LAUSD did not immediately heed CACSI‟s calls to reform and enhance the district‟s
integration initiative.108
By March 1977, CACSI had submitted its final recommendations for a
desegregation plan to the LAUSD. In effect, the proposed plan encompassed “a 3year period beginning in September 1977” and ending in June 1980.109 It explicitly
stated that “all schools would be integrated so that no school enrollment would
exceed 60 percent of one minority.”110 The plan mandated desegregation for the
LAUSD‟s segregated elementary schools through mandatory busing in the first year
and for its junior high schools in the second year. However, integrating senior high
schools through forced busing in the third year did not occur. Instead, those schools
faced the ill-fated prospects of voluntary desegregation “through magnet schools.”111
Despite CACSI‟s integration proposals, the LAUSD decided that mandatory busing
would only work best at the fourth, fifth, and sixth grade levels. Paralleling the
CCSD‟s Sixth Grade Center Plan in Las Vegas, the LAUSD established “specialized
learning centers to which fourth, fifth, and sixth graders attending segregated schools
(75 percent minority or white) would be transported for one 9-week period during the
school year.”112 Such a plan “allowed for no desegregation from kindergarten
through third grade” due to concerns over the psychological traumas stemming from
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busing at such a young age.113 Thus, a sharp divide had clearly developed between
CACSI and the LAUSD over how to properly integrate Los Angeles‟ schools.
This divide rapidly manifested itself in a battle between the courts and the
LAUSD. Judge Egly and the LAUSD sparred repeatedly over the creation of an
adequate desegregation plan.114 Bill Boyarski, a columnist for the Los Angeles Times,
described the situation as “a classic confrontation of American government - a judge
pitted against a school board in a desegregation case, part of a struggle that goes back
to the days when judges first began ordering school boards to desegregate.”115 This
depiction basically defined the nature of the school integration debate in many
American cities during the 1970s. Mandatory desegregation was an issue that
garnered much flak, particularly in the realm of politics. Yet the typical response by
school boards was “to put pressure on the judge.”116 Nathaniel Jones, an attorney for
the Los Angeles NAACP, claimed that such a tactic “frees them (the board) of any
political heat.”117 Making the courts appear like the true villains in the school
desegregation process was the boards‟ ultimate goal.
Even though the Crawford decision ended in 1976, the infighting between the
courts and the LAUSD turned into a kind of post-trial litigation process. Judge Egly
declared the LAUSD‟s integration plan to be “constitutionally deficient under
California constitutional standards,” as it “neither eliminates nor begins to eliminate
segregated schools.”118 Yet the LAUSD appealed Egly‟s condemnation to identify
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the “legal basis” and “constitutional mandate” for desegregation.119 And like the
Kelly case in Las Vegas, the courts found that segregated schools violated minorities‟
(blacks and Hispanics) rights to Equal Protection.120 Perhaps the bigger question
regarding Los Angeles‟ school integration was where the responsibility to bus
resided. Of course, the arguments of LAUSD officials resembled those of the CCSD
in declaring that residential segregation was not the product of their policies.
Therefore, “the legal burden to desegregate” did not necessarily sit with the
LAUSD.121
Another point of contention between the courts and the LAUSD involved the
disparities in per-pupil spending among segregated schools. This issue also surfaced
in the Kelly decision, as schools in the Westside received less funding from the CCSD
compared to schools in other areas of the school district.122 In a court battle that
raged in the California judicial system at the same time as the Crawford case, the
1971 Serrano v. Priest decision “declared that the disparities between rich and poor
[school] districts resulted in unequal – and therefore unconstitutional – distribution of
funds.”123 Accordingly, the Serrano ruling invalidated “the state‟s system of
financing schools with local property taxes.”124 In doing so, the California Supreme
Court sought to attack residential segregation by equalizing school funding. Since
residential segregation effectively brought about school segregation, the Crawford
and Serrano cases were simply another means to combat residential segregation.
119

Jeanne Thiel Landis, “The Crawford Desegregation Suit in Los Angeles 1977-81: The Multiethnic
Community Versus BUSTOP” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1984), 65.
120
Landis, “The Crawford Desegregation Suit in Los Angeles 1977-81,” 65.
121
Landis, “The Crawford Desegregation Suit in Los Angeles 1977-81,” 66.
122
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Ten Communities, 209.
123
Jack D. Fine, “Benefits of Public-Interest Lawyer Fees,” Los Angeles Times (31 March 1978), E7.
124
Fine, “Benefits of Public-Interest Lawyer Fees,” E7.

88

The Serrano decision equalized school funding, but it did so at the expense of
taxpayers. There was a massive backlash against this court ruling, particularly from
wealthy Californians who did not want their tax dollars funding poor, inner-city, and
segregated schools. In 1978, Californians voted for Proposition 13, which capped
property taxes throughout the state. It served as the vehicle through which wealthy
[white] Californians vented their collective frustrations over the Serrano case. Yet
the courts largely ignored this taxpayer revolt. In fact, the California Supreme Court
even cited the Serrano decision as a precedent for Crawford, asserting that “wealth
discrimination in the public school system” constituted a form “of de facto racial
segregation” that could not stand in a school district as large as the LAUSD.125
As if pressure from the courts was not enough, the LAUSD faced lawsuits
from both the San Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce (SFVCC) and BUSTOP.
These lawsuits collectively represented the anti-busing faction in Los Angeles. Both
the SFVCC and BUSTOP were semi-reactionary organizations that viewed forced
busing as an unwarranted nuisance.126 Given that the city‟s busing initiative
primarily entailed black and Hispanic students being bused from South Central and
East Los Angeles to white schools in the San Fernando Valley, the SFVCC claimed
the Valley had suffered dire economic consequences from busing.127 But the courts
saw no merit in hearing these particular lawsuits, especially since Serrano proved that
wealth discrimination in California‟s public schools ought to be eliminated even at
the expense of potential economic harm to a community.
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Conclusion
Above all, mandatory busing in the context of school desegregation was a
unique American phenomenon. No other Western society engaged in this kind of
social experiment on such a large scale. It gained momentum on the coattails of the
Civil Rights Movement. The 1954 Brown decision coupled with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act served as two major catalysts for school integration. Yet it was not until
the 1971 Swann ruling that busing became a constitutional solution to an
unconstitutional problem. As a lingering constitutional legacy from the late
nineteenth century, the Jim Crow system had become politically unpalatable by the
early 1970s.128 And with forced busing, Jim Crow was once again able to reemerge
in the ethnoracial fear and violence that materialized during the school desegregation
process. Ultimately, the extent to which ethnoracial tensions drove the busing
movements in Las Vegas and Los Angeles was clearly evident in the legal briefs filed
for each city‟s court case, as the NAACP and ACLU both emphasized multiform
racial segregation as the primary problem.
Upon further examination of the busing process in Las Vegas and Los
Angeles, there were two main parallels. First, wealthy whites in both cities were able
to take their children out of the public schools, and thus, they avoided the negative
side effects associated with mandatory busing. Wealthy whites also pointed to the
ethnoracial violence that stemmed from forced busing to demonstrate that the process
was simply unacceptable in a society that cherished law and order. Second, poor
whites and ethnic minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics, had to endure
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firsthand the psychological traumas of busing. The burden of busing undoubtedly
resided with ethnoracial minorities. It was their schools that faced closure, and in
one-way busing plans, they were the ones who had to endure the inconveniences of
additional transportation measures. These facts put pressure on the courts to
recognize the potential harm being done to young students, especially given their
impressionability. In the end, however, mandatory busing constituted a necessary
measure along the road to ridding many of America‟s inner-city public schools of Jim
Crow segregation.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Purpose of Study (Reanalyzed)
One of the primary purposes of this study centers on demonstrating how the
industrial-resort paradigm applies to Las Vegas and Los Angeles. For the purposes of
my thesis, Las Vegas signified the resort city with its cornucopia of casinos and
hotels and Los Angeles represented the industrial city with its coastal trade operations
and manufacturing core. The idea of tourism as Las Vegas‟ main source of revenue
meant that ethnoracial tensions had to be tightly controlled by the city‟s government.
Los Angeles, alternatively, maintained a more diverse urban economy, and thus,
interruptions to its revenue stream from race riots and other ethnoracial disturbances
could be tolerated to a certain degree. In short, the industrial-resort paradigm serves
as an important complement to the urban ethnoracial framework.
Aside from its complementary role with the urban ethnoracial framework, the
industrial-resort paradigm promotes the idea that multiform segregation is a uniquely
urban process marked by the close social interactions of multiple ethnoracial groups.
In fact, the clustered environments of most urban (and suburban) ghettos and barrios
encouraged residents to cooperate, especially in adverse situations. This cooperation
often led to the development of strong communal bonds, even as the urban crises
threatened to destroy any semblance of unity among residents in either the ghetto or
barrio. But after World War II, the presence of whites in the inner city grew
increasingly scarce. In the end, there was a friction of distance between whites and
other ethnoracial groups that only resulted in fear and mistrust.
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Revisiting the Urban Ethnoracial Framework
Available to historians and sociologists alike, the urban ethnoracial framework
seeks to explain how multiform segregation can lead to urban crises. Although it
generally falls outside the traditional Montgomery-to-Memphis structure of the Civil
Rights Movement, the urban ethnoracial framework does offer a basic foundation for
the school desegregation narrative. And unlike the Montgomery-to-Memphis story,
which was primarily a Southern phenomenon, the urban ethnoracial framework
addresses segregation, ghettos/barrios, and riots in any American city that displays
the pertinent historical or sociological symptoms. With their extensive racial
segregation in housing, schooling, and employment, especially at the onset of World
War II, Las Vegas and Los Angeles appeared ideal when considering the application
of the urban ethnoracial framework in a comparative historical study.
In conducting a comparative historical study, the urban ethnoracial framework
permits historians to evaluate the history of multiple cities with constant references to
multiform segregation and the urban crises. For instance, historian Thomas Sugrue
found that “segregated housing compounded the urban crisis” and “the combination
of deindustrialization, white flight, and hardening ghettoization” only muddled urban
ethnoracial issues.1 Even though Sugrue‟s main focus centered on inner-city Detroit,
his remarks explicitly allude to the urban ethnoracial framework. But urban
ethnoracial issues were “as much a political as a social construction.”2 Therefore, the
urban ethnoracial framework should be flexible in its interpretation of processes such
as deindustrialization, ghettoization, and segregation.
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Comparing and Contrasting the Two Cities
The primary contribution of my thesis to the pertinent historiography is the
comparative study it offers of Las Vegas and Los Angeles with respect to ethnoracial
issues such as segregation and rioting. Because Las Vegas possessed a smaller
population than Los Angeles and relied mostly on tourism for municipal revenues,
race relations were more fluid, and thus, ethnoracial tensions flared and sub-sided in a
more rapid fashion. Los Angeles, however, sought to maintain an image of racial
tolerance to attract a large workforce for meeting the labor demands of its booming
economy. This image became shattered due to race riots in the 1940s and 1960s, but
the city‟s large industrial base was able to absorb most of the detrimental societal
effects stemming from ethnoracial violence. Ultimately, these similarities and
differences can be explained by the industrial-resort paradigm.
Since ghettos and barrios signified the outward manifestations of racial
segregation in each city, clear explanations of them are essential. Ghettos, in Las
Vegas and Los Angeles, consisted of African Americans who congregated in
particular urban and suburban spaces according to cultural affinities such as singlerace housing, jobs, and schools. Although racially isolated and spatially separated
from other areas of the city, these ghettos thrived on the spirit of self-reliance.
Similarly, Los Angeles‟ barrio encompassed Mexican-American neighborhoods with
distinctive cultural traditions rooted in the Spanish culture. These cultural traditions
encountered resistance on occasion from Anglo Americans who viewed the city‟s
Mexican past as a negative part of its history. The racial tensions that resulted from
such an ethnocentric outlook were a major component of the city‟s race riots.
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Comparative Urban Analysis (Continued)
To reinforce the comparative urban analysis presented in my thesis, it
becomes necessary to define the word “urban” and how it relates to Las Vegas and
Los Angeles. In effect, urban means city, which demographically defined for the
purposes of this study would involve a specified area exceeding 30,000 people.
Under that definition, Las Vegas did not become “urban” until the 1950s. Los
Angeles, on the other hand, achieved “urban” status in the late nineteenth century.
Given the distinct rates of population growth, each city‟s ethnoracial issues developed
differently. But the urban ethnoracial framework accounts for these differences by
also considering geographic features as part of the comparative urban study. In this
regard, Las Vegas and Los Angeles are grouped as Western cities with the legacy of
World War II defense spending as inciting the growth of ethnoracial diversity.
Overall, Las Vegas and Los Angeles are two Western cities with histories
rooted in ethnoracial tension. This comparative urban study demonstrates how the
similarities and differences between each city affected the development of multiform
segregation and the urban crises in housing, employment, and education. Race riots
and the ghetto underclass collectively signify intricate by-products of the urban crises
that multiform segregation precipitated. Conducting a comparative analysis of the
ethnoracial histories of both cities reveals that not only was multiform segregation
present in each one, but also the integration solutions to eradicate it were both gradual
and ineffective at times. Ultimately, Las Vegas and Los Angeles serve as poignant
case studies for investigating the development of urban race relations in the American
West.
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